LAWYERS WITHOUT BORDERS

CATHERINE A . ROGERS*
1.
Historically,

attorney

INTRODUCTION
regulation

presumed

that

lawvers

practice i n the delimited geographical jurisdiction where they

are

licensed.1 Most lawyers were sole practitioners and, insofar as they
exjstecl,

Jaw

firms

were

relatively

intimate

organizations

of

partners who a l l knew each other and primarily serviced loca l
clients on local matters in local courts.2

In recent years, this

' Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University,
University Park, Pennsylvania & Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan,
Italy and member of the American Society of International Law ("ASH.") Task
Force on Global Professional Responsibility. I would like to thank the members of
the ASIL Task Force, and particularly Detlev Vagts, for their contributions to my
thinking on these topics. Of course, the views, and any accompanying errors, are
mine alone. I am also grateful for the many ideas and insights I received from
Jose Alvarez, Gary Born, Bill Dodge, Andy Kaufman, Claudia Krapf, Laurel Terry,
Marco Ventoruzzo, Ted Schneyer, Bill Simon, David Wilkins, Stephen Wilske, and
the many other global advocates who have been willing to share with n1e their
experiences. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of
Nevada at Las Vegas Law School, at the Globalization of the Legal Profession
Symposium at Harvard Law School, and to the City Bar of New York Task Force
on International Practice, where it benefitted from questions and comments of
those present. Finally, I owe a debt to Jamie Coleman and Susham Modi for their
excellent research assistance.
1 See Charles W. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-of-State
Lawyers, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2002) (arguing that lawyers are habitually
divided into two groups: those who are locally licensed and therefore subject to
regulatory power of the local bar, and those who are not).
2 As Mary Daly explains:
Until recently, lawyers infrequently practiced in more than one state.
Law firms rarely established branch offices, with the possible exception
of an office in Washington, D.C. or in a distant city to meet the particular
needs of a single client. Consequently, in searching for ethical guidance,
lawyers, courts, and disciplinary authorities looked only to the
professional standards adopted by a single jurisdiction, the lawyer's state
of general admission or the court to which the lawyer had been admitted
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localism has given vvay to global i sm.:; The figurcs rneasuring this
transition arc stC1gge ring. Prior to World VVar U, only four U.S. lav.'
finns had <1n overseas office.-1

By 2004, the number had grown to

381 foreign law offices i n se venty
foreign countries . "

s ix

-

cities in forty-eight different

Several other data points portray similarly

dra1natic tales of international expm1sion,6 including gains for
smaller and rncdiurn-size law firms in the glo ba l market for legal
serv ices.? Professional regulation of attorneys is still attem.p ting to
catch up with these demographic developments, most recently
through revisions to Model �Rule 8.5 ('Rule SS' or the ''Rule").
The thesis of this Article is that, while Rule 8.5 i s a meaningful

Mary C Daly,

Rc�oll'ing Etltiml Ccl/lfl;ct::. i11 Mulliiurisdicfionn/ Prnctice -·Is Model
Rule 8.5 lite All�il't!r, 1111 An�wcr, w No Answer 111 All?, 36 S. TEX. L. RF.v. 715, 719
(1995). For an insightful anulysis of how the term "partner" h<:1s become

something of a misnomer ns U.S. law firms have erupted into large corporate-like
structures thLlt sprawl across multiple jurisdictions, see David 13. Wilkins,

Partner,
Sltmnrtner! EEOC v. Sidley A�t>tin Brown & Wood, 120 HArW L REV. 1264 (2007).
3 The

intermediate

slep

between

th.�

local

and

the

global

is

multi

jurisdiction<Jl dom�stic prnctice and the rise of the national law firm. This Article
does not direcllv uddress this phase, but several otheY scholars have documented

this development and its significance for the legal profession.

See gwemlly Gary
Multljuri�clictinnn/ Prncticc v{ Law: Recent Development::; in t/rc Nntio11nl
Dehnle, 2 7 j. LEGAL PRor. 91 (2003) (exploring developments in multi-jurisdictional
practice and arguing that reform is essential); John F. Sutton, Jr., LlllaulhMizcd
Practice of Lm:u by Lawyer�: A Ptl�/-Selllilltir Rejlectioll on "Ethics nud /he
Mttltijuri::dictionnl PtncticL· ��fLaw," 36 S. Tsx. L. REv. 1027 (1995) (discussing
unauthorized practice of law by out-of-state lawyers); Gerard J. Clark, The Two
Fnces of Mu/ti-Jurisdictitlltnl Prnctice, 29 N. KY. L REV. 251, 273-77 (2002)
A. MUJU1eke,

(entertaining a proposal to eliminate restrictions on interstate practice).

<� See Carole Silver, Wi!lners ll!ld Losers in tltc Gfobn/i:zatioll of Legnl Seruices:
Situating tlze Mnrket for Foreign Lawyers, 45 VA.]. ll\.'T'L L. 897, 916-"17 (2005) (noting

the growth of foreign offices backed by U.S. law firms). Notably, these statistics
come from a study of only sixty firms1 so the overall number is probably higher.
5 Jd.

6 For example, as Laurel Terry notes, ''six of the world's ten highest-grossing

law firms had more than

50%

of their lawyers working in countries outside of the

firm's home country." Laurel S. Terry,

A "How Ttl'' Guide for Incorporating Globnl
and Compnmtive Perspectives into the Required Professional Responsibility Course, 51
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1135, 1138 (2007) (quoting The Global 100, AM. LAW, Oct. 2006, at
139).
7 See Carole Silver, Regulatory NliSI/!lltch in !11e Market for Legnl Seruices, 23 Nw.
J. TNT'I. L. & B us. 487, 495 (2003) (''The international label is not claimed only by
large law firms; even srnall Finns partiClpate in this specialty.").
This
phenomenon is a logical counterpart of the increased partidpation of smaller <md

See Elena V. Helmer1
medium sized companies in the global economy.
l11temntiollal Com111crcinl Arbitration: Americn11ized, "Civili:ed," or Harmonized?, ] 9

01-HO ST.

]. ON 0151'.

RESOL. 33, 40 (2003) (noting the increase in the number of

American IC�w firms that provide arbitration services).
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attempt tL� respond lc) an obvious need, it ultimately causes rnore
problems than it resolves and must be revised.

The

Americ<m

Bar

AssociC�tion

fiTst

sought

to

e1ddress

attorneys' Jclivities outside the state i n which they vvere licensed
by promulgating Model Rule 8.5 i n 1983. 8
expressly

dis<1vovvecl

distingu ished

from

''my

,lpplication

i nterstate)

activities.

Origi nally, the Rule
to

transnational
Instead,

it

(as

left

all

questions 0bout conflicting ethical rules abroad to "agreements
between jurisdictions or . . . appropriate international lmv."

The

problem was thnt there were no such agreements or rules o£
international law, which

meant international activities of U.S.

attorneys, were v·irtuaJly unregulated.')

In later versions, Rule 8..5's linlitation to interstate practice was
it

was

expressly

extended

to

transnational

abandoned

and

activibes.l0

With respect to advocacy, which is the focus of this

Article,ll the text of the Rule- now applicable to international
practice- provides that "for conduct in connection with a matter
pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction i n which the
tribunal sits [shall applyL w1less the rules of the tribunal provide

otherwise . . . . " 1 2

:; As Me1ry Dalv has explained, Model Rule 8. 5 is not an ethical rule at all, but
a choice of law rule. See Daly, Sll!lrn note 2, at 755(noting that Model Rule 8. 5 is "a
rule about choosing mles"). The Model Rules have been frequently amended
sfnce the American Bar Associt'ltion adopted them in 1983, with the most recent
amend.mcn t iJ1 2002.
9 Advocates may still be subject to other iorms of regulation, such as criminal
and civil sanctions, as well as oversight by other administrative agencies. for an

extended discussion of the various mechanisms that regulate altomey conduct, see
David B. Wilkins, Wllu Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105HARV. L. RF.v. 8 0 1 (1992).

10 Specifically, Comment 7provides "[tJhe choice oflaw provision [contained
in Rule 8. 5] applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice. " MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 8. 5 cmt. 7 (2002).

11
Unless otherwise indicated, this Article
Role 8. 5 that apply to advocates, meaning
resolution activities. Other provisions of the
transactional work have different choice of law
note 27, and e�ccompanying text.

12

considers only those aspects of
attorneys involved in dispute
Rule pertaining to advisory or
provisions in Rule 8.5. See i1�{ra

MODEl RULESOFPROF'L CONDUCT R 8.5(b)(1) (200 2). The full text of Rule

8. 5is as follows:
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this
jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction,
tegnrdless of where the lawyer>s conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted
in this jtu·isdiction is e1lso subject to the disciplinary authority of this
i urisdictior\ if the I;C�wyer provides or offers to provide any legal services
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Currently, eighteen states have adopted Rule 8.5, and another
nineteen h<lve adopted similar rules.13 The Rule was adopted in
response to a request by .internationJl attorneys for more guidance,
and, for all i.ts flaws, it does bring a measure of certainty. For these
reasons, it represents an important developrDent and

a

meaningful

starting point in cross-border regulation of global advocates.14 At
bottom, however, the Rule is a failed e, perimcnt as applied to
international advocacy and it n1.ust be reconsidered.
Rule

8.5's

advocacy

provts1ons

were

meant

to

provide

guidance about vvhich rules to apply when U.S. attorneys are
operating in foreign legal systems or before international tribunals.
In these contexts, many e1spects of U.S. attorneys' conduct m.a y be
considered unprofessional, unethical, or even illegal. For exan1ple,
in

nwst foreign

examination
considered

and international tribunals,

techniques

and

unprofessional

at

aggtcssivc
least,

U.S.-style

litigation

and

cross

tactics

sometimes

are

overtly

in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority
of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.
(b) Choice of Lnw. In any exercise of the disciplinary autho r ity of this
j u risdiction , tht· rules u[ professional conduct Lo be applied shall be as
follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a n1attcr pending before a tribunal, the
rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the
tribunal provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is
in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to
the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's
conduct conforms to the ru1es of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer
reasonably believes the predominant effect of Lhe lawyer's conduct will
occur.

Id.
13 For a chart illustrating the implementation of Rule 8. 5, see Am. Bar Ass'n
[ABA), State lmple111mtation of ABA Model Rule 8.5 (2009), available nt
http:/ jwww.abanet.org/ cpr/ mjp/ quick-guide_8. 5.pdf.
J4 The Council of Law and Bar Societies of Europe ("CCBE") Code of
Conduct £or European Lawyers has identified the problem, but not offered any
real guidance or solution, other than that attorneys inform themselves. Article 2.4
of the CCBE Code pTovides: "When practising cross-border, a lawyer from
anotl1er Member State may be bound to comply with the professional mles of the
Host Member State. La...,vy ers have a duty to inform themselves as to the rules
which will affect them in the performance of any particular activity. " CCBE CODE
Of CONOUCf FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEA.;'J COMMUNITY art. 2. 4 (2006). For a more
comprehensive overview of recent developments in this mea, see Laurel S. Terry,
U.S. Legal Ethics: Tl1e Collling of Age of Gtobnl nnrf Cvntpamfiz,e Perspecti'Ues, 4 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 463, 494 (2005) [hereinaJter Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics].
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Meanwhile, attorney advertising and contingency fees,

both standard practices in the United States, are regarded as
ethically contemptuous in most foreLgn legal systems.

Tn some

foreign countries, having a prive1tc individual or corn.pany serve
process is downrigl1t illega 1, as is the hmdamental practice of
preparing
in

a

conh·ast

vvitness for upcoming testimony.
to

their foreign

cou nterparts,

On lhe other hand,
U.S.

attorneys

are

generally bound by more extensive confidentiality obligations, by
more restrictive notions of conflicts of interest, and by specific
duties to report client perjury to a tribunal.1s

With many of these

examples, it would be clifficul t or impossible for an attorney to
abide by both sets

of r u les,

and RL1lc 8.5 was designed to provide

clear guidance about which rules to follow.
The problem, however, is that the current version of Rule 8.5
does not resolve these conflicts.

Perhaps even worse, when

applied to international tribunals, the Rule alrnost ensures that U.S.
altorneys will be abiding by etb.ical rules that are different from
their opposing counsel's and that are utterly unrelated to the
relevant tribunal or its procedures (unless the tribunal has adopted
its own rules). One signal that R u l e 8.5 misses its mark is that the
outcomes it prescribes shocked pracbtioners who have appeared
before the lran-U.S. Claims Tribunal or the International Court of
Ju stice. Inforrnal survey research reveals that the attorneys had no
idea that they were bound by Dutch ethical rules. The reason for
this surprise, as discussed in more detail below, is that the physical
location of these international tribun.aJs is largely unrelated to their
purposes and procedures, or to the expectations of lawyers or
presiding judges and arbitrators.1 6
Ultimately,

Rule

8.5's

shortcomj11gs

can

be

traced

to

its

assun1ptions about territoriality and the historical relationship
between the jurisdiction of tribunals and the licensir1. g of attorneys.
These assu. m ption s stem from the Rule's original focus on domestic
attorneys in a federal systen1 who are l icensed in one jurisdiction
and occasionally perform professional services in another sister
state.

International

practice was

added as something of an

15 For an overview of these and other the ways that U.S. ethical obligations
and procedural practices conflict with those of foreign systems, see Peter C.
Kostanl, Snaed Cows or Cnsl! Co;us: The Abuse of Rhetoric i11 Justifying Some Cutte11t
Norms of Trnnsnctional Lmoyeri11g, 36 WAKF. FOREST L. REv. 49 (2001); Catherine A.
Rogers, Fit n11d Fu11cfion in Legal £thics: Developing a Code of Con duel for Internaliuunl
Arbitrntivn, 23 NIICH.]. J�r'L L. 3cJl (2002); Terry, U.S. Legnl Ethics, supra note 14.
16 See inji·�1 notes 40--t7 <HHJ <!ccompanying text.
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a fter thought,
importa n t

but

ways

app arently
in

w hich

,

wi thout

fully

concep tions

of

considering
juris d iction

the
and

terri toriality differ in transnational, as opposed to federal, con texts.
A s I describe in Section 2, superimposing a federal rul e to the
transnatio nal

sys tem

produces

certain

concep tua l

and

terminological problems that make it difficu l t to a p p l y to global
legal advoca tes.
The5e probl e ms are exacerba ted when the Rule i s a p plied to
pra.ctical situatior:s .

In Section 3, I i l lustr a te the problems caused

by some of these a p p lications .

Finally, in Section 4,

I make

affirmative proposa l s for how to rectify some of the p robl ems that
R ule 8.5 lea ves unresolved.
confl ict-of-laws
solution s.

analysis

To that end, I outline a n a p p roach to

tha t

will

produce

more

s a tisf actory

For international tribunals, I argue that n a tiona l rules

can never prov i d e an a d equate substitute for tribu nal-specific
rules, and ca ll on interna tiona l tribu nals to bet ter a r ticulate and
develop their own rules .
Finally, with respect to enforcement, I argue for a coordin a ted
approach that has licensing and regula tory authorities working
with foreign and interna tional tribunals and re gula tory a u t horitie s .
In

other

areas

of

transnational

regu la tion- such

as

antitr u s t,

securities, and corruption- international networks h a v e d eveloped
to promote transna tional regulatory gov ernanceY

In l arge part,

these networks have been built by international lawyers operating
in various capacities, such as government officials, j u d ges, NGO
organizers, and client representatives.

It is time now for them to

turn simila r efforts to their own self-regulation. 1s

17

The seminal work on international networks is, of course,
A NEW WORLD ORDER 20-21 (2004).
Some efforts are underway:

ANNE-MARJE

SLAUGHTER,
18

At the 2006 and 2007 ABA Annual Meetings, the E.U.-U.S. Legal Services
Summits were co-hosted by the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of
Europe (CCBE), and the Asia-U.S. Legal Services Sunu11its included
lawyers and bar leaders from Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Singapon:, and Vietnam. The ITILS Task Force also convened
discussions with Latin Am.erican bar leaders at the Fall Meetings of the
Section of International Law in Houston in 2005 and in Miami in 2006.
The ITILS Task Force also communicates regularly with the International
Bar Association (IBA), the Union Internationale des Avocats (UTA), the
Law Society of England and Wales, and the Law Council of Australia to
exchange information, coordinate initiatives, and discuss strategies.
Laurel S. Terry et al ., Transnntiorwl Legal Pmctice, 42 1NT'L LAW. 833, 842 (2008).
Many of these developments are being driven by concerns about regulation of
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21
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2.
When

U.S.

] 04]

REGL:LATJ;\JG U.S. ATTORNEYS ABROAD
authorities

finally

a ttenlpted

to

catch

ethical

regulation up w i t h the g1obal activities o f modern lawyers, they
borrowed for the international arena a rule that was drafted for
domestic multi-jurisdictional practice in a federc:d system.

This

Section reviews the textual and conceptual problems that result
fron1 that extc11sion.
2.1. Tile Drnflillg(�{Rule8.5

f\s enacted

in

1983,

a quick read of R u l e 8.5 n1 i g h t have

suggested that i t dncs apply to U.S. lawyers practicing l a w ou tside
the Unjted States.

As noted above, the 1983 version of the R u l e

provided t h a t " fo r conduct i n connection w i t h a matter before a
tribunat the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits
[shall

apply],

unless

the

rules

of

the

tribunal

provide

otherwise ... . " 1 9 ·n,e text1.1al breadth of the Rule was belied by a
specific

exclusion

of

i n ternational

lawyers

from

the

Rule.

international l awyers themselves had vigorously fought for this
exclusion.:w

As a resul t of their efforts, Comment 6 to the 1983

version of the Rule disavowed any application to transnational o r
international legal practice1'1 a n d instead left a n y conflict-of-laws
analysis to nonexistent /Jagrcements between jurisdictions or . . .
appropriate internationall a w . "22
Some years later, U.S. l a wyers engaged in. international practice
apparently concluded that vagaries about which ethical rules apply

legal services in international trade. See Laurel S. Terry, The GATS nnd Legal
Services i n Limerick, 15 MICH. ST. J, lNT'L L. 635 (2007) (addressing recent service

related GATS developments).
19 MODEL R ULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf R. 8.5 (1983).
2o Tel'ty, U.S. legal Etllic:s, supra note 14, at 525 (2005).
21 Comment 6 to the original version of the Rule, which provided that it was
"not intended to apply to transnational practice/' was deleted in August 2002. See
ABA, Ethics 2000 Commission Reporter's Explanation of Recommendation,
Changes to the Rule, in ABA C ENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBIUTY, A LEGlSLATIYE
HlSTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA M O DEL RULES OP PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf1
1982-2005, 827, 831 (2006) [hereinafter Reporter1s £A-planation] (noting that the
Commission m21de this modification because it "believe[d] that lavvyers enga,gecl
in transnational practice ought to be governed by this Rule's choice of law
provision").
22 See suprn nQte 9 and nccompcmying text.
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coul d be more perilou s than liberating.23 Accordingly, in 2001, the
International Law section of the ABA requested that Rule 8.5 be
revised to provide greater choice-of-law guidance to transnation a l
and international practitioners . 2-+
As

a

result the 2002 revisions deleted Com_ment 6 a n d r epbced

it with the cu rrent Comment 7, which expressly rejected the
exclu sion, providing in stead that the " choice of l a w provision
The
applies to l awyers enga ged in transnational practice . "2s
consequence

of this change

was

to

make

Rule

8.5' s

gen eral

provision- that conduct by attorneys in connection with liti gation
is governed by the " rules of the juris diction in which the tribu nal
sits" -applicable to activities by U.S. attorneys abroa d .

Sin1 i l ar to

former Comment 6, the new Comment 7 makes reference

to

" international law, treaties or other agree1nents between competent
regulatory au thorities in the affected jurisdiction s . "26 In contrast to
the earlier Comment however, these international sources onl y
become applicable if they produce a different resu l t t h a n t h e basic
choice-of-law provision of Rule 8.5.
Another

important

Commission is
version's

that

references

recognition of

II

c hange

the word
to

II

brought

by

" tribuna l "

cour t . "

This

the

E thics

replaced

change

was

the

2000
earlier

made

in

the incre asing use of a lternative dispute-resolution

processes," and extended the Rule to " binding arbitra tion and
other methods of formal l y a djudicating the rights of partie s . "27 As
a resu l t of these changes, for those states that have adopted it, Rul e

8.5

now purports t o provide choice-of-l aw

guidance for U . S .

a ttorneys who appear before foreign courts, interna tiona l courts
and tribunals, and international arbitral tribunals.
As described in more detail b elow, the current version of Rule

8.5 creates as many problems as it resolves. These probl e ms may
have been foreshadowed by the drafting history of the provision,
which does not reveal any express consideration of the unique
complications

involved

1n

international

and

transna tional

23 See Terry, U.S. Legal E thics, s upra note 14, at 525 (showing that lawyers are
becoming increasingly sensitive to the comparative ethics issues, and possibly
liability as well, through the ABA Section of International Law's urged reforms).
24

Id.

25

MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R.

26

Id.

27

Reporter's Explanation,

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21

s upra

8.5 cmt. 7 (2002).

note 21, at 829-30.
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More fundament<�lly, the current version of

Rule 8.3

proceeds from mi sc on c ep t ions about the nature of international
litigation and a r bitra tion, as well as the character a n d content of
foreign cthic<1l regimes.

These erroneous underpim1ings produce

p a r ticu l a rly anomalous results when a pp l ie d

to advocates

ln

i n te rn a tiomd practice.

2.2. Specill! Pn.rui:;ions jc1r Adt.1ocntrs
1n a n �Kknowledgement that advocacy rai ses distinct issues

frmn other t�'pes of le gal represenlationl Rule 8.5 i nclu des special
provisions for ad \'OG:ltes. Specifically, it provides that" for conduct
in L'O nnect it'l l l with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rule s [of
profession<1l conduc t] of the jurisdiction in w hich the tribunal sits
[shall apply], un l ess the rules of the tribunal provide othervvise."2'.1
Rule 8.5's p rovi si ons regarding non-adjudicatory tr an sna t i onal
activities admit that ''no s j n g le test ... can be applied to determine
the ap p ropria te choice-of-law rule in each case. 1130 Accordingly,
that part ot the Rule permits some fl exibili ty for a t torn eys and
disciplinary a u th o r i ties to assess the appropriateness of ethical
rules to particular conduct.:r1

Tn conh·astl the Rule's provisions for

To be tair to the drafters of Rule 8.5, many of these problems are nol
readily appc1rcnt even to international dispute resolution practitioners, and would
be diffintlt to torecast without direct experience in the international proceedings.
:!':! MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(1) (2002). Specific ally, the 1993
version provided that for conduct "in connection with a proceeding in a cou rt
before w hich ,, l.:lwyer has been admitted to prac tice . . . the rules to be applied
shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the
court provide otherwise.'r MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(1) (1993),
nvailable
af
http://www.law .cornell.edu/ethics/ aba/2001/ABA_CODE.HTM
#Rule_8.5.
3ll ABA,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 397 (2000). Model Rule 8.S(b)(2) addresses transnational
transactionRl and corporate practice, provid i ng
��

for any other conduct the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's
concf ucl occt.�rredJ or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a
different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shaJl be app lied to the
conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipHne if the lawyer's
conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer
reasonably beLieves the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will
occur.
MODELRuu:.•;QF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2)

(2002).
3 1 This flexibi li ty is not without its prob l ems . One member of the committee
"filed a statement designRted 'dubitante' in whi ch he expressed significant due
process and equal protection reservations" with the ntle. Daly, suprn note 2, at
757.
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Rdvocates contain no such qualifying language, and hence permit
no

discretione1ry

appropriate.

ana lysis

regarding

which

rules

The justificZ�tion for this inflexibility

would

be

is that the

advocate1s ethiccd obligations are firmly tethered to the location of
the

adjudicatory

decisionmaker.

There are good

rce�sons

for specia I choice-of-law rules t h a t

apply exclusively to adjudicatory settings, and for linking those
rules to the adjudicatory dccisionmaker. One of the most p ressing

reC�sons for insisting

on a

clear rule is to avoid the possibility th21t

opposing attorneys in the same proceed1 n g co u ld be

s

u bjec t

to

different ethic al rule.s. As Detlcv Vagts cogently explains:
[I]t would

not be

workable to allow the counsel

for

o pp osi n g sides in a civil case to enter the courtromn subject
to different rules . . . It wou l d not do to proh ibi t one lawyer
.

from a civil law jttrisdiction from intexviewing a witness
before the trial while th e Amctican la wyer would n o t only
"
be a !lowed to do so but would be guilty of professional
negligence

if he or she presented

an

un-intcrviewed

witness." 32
While this eq uality-of-arms consideration is a p owerful reason
to regulate attorneys appearing in international and transnational
adjudicatory settings,33 as illustrated below, application of Rule

8.5

fails to ens ure the d esired result.34 Even worse, in som.e contexts it
may actually increase the likelihood that attorneys in the same
adjudkation will be abiding by different rules.
Another reason why adjudicatory settings deserve special rules
is that presiding tribunals are presumed to have a particularized
interest in regulating attorneys appearing before them, as well as

32

Detlev Vagts, Professional Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and
13 GEO. j. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 690 (2000).
33 Impartiality is an attribute of adjudicators, which i n tt:trn demands nudi
nlteram partem, or equality of the parties. See, e.g., V.S. MAN!, INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 16-17 (1980) (discussing the irnportance of
nudi alteram partem in the formation of procedt\ral r ules ) . As told in the Sanskrit
play Mric/zchakntica, as far back as 485 B.C., courts in lndia honored this principle
by not allowing the fact that a complainant �was the king's brother-in-law to
influence the court's integrity. [d. at 17.
34 See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
effects Rule 8.5 may have on the proceedings in front of the Jnternational Court of
Justice).

Resolution,

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21

LAVVY!:l�S

200'1]

WfTHOUT BORDERS

1045

particular authority over the conduct of those atlorneys.15
ordinary dwice-of-Jaw
contacts,

as

An

rule based o n the weight of territorial

found in the other provisions of Ruh:� 8.5, might not

gi vc adequate deference to the tribunal's interest or proced ural
authority.

\A/bile f�ule 8.5 ties a p p l icable ethical rules to the

tribunal, however, i t dues n o t a fford them a n explicit role in
€·nforcing those rules . .:<11

This oversight is not a d i rect affront to

i n ternational tribunals, lTtcmy of which do not contemplate for
themsel\'es an C'<press role in regulating a ttortteys who appear

before them.

It is, however, a missed opportunity lo help U.S.

regulatory anthorities in interpreting and enforcing tht' c1 pplicable
rulcs

.

2.3.

.17

Blutry Unes nnd Bu iit-ln Ambiguities

The stated a i m of the current version of Rule 8.5 i s to provide
for

Jlrelatively

regulators

to

simple,

bright-line

determine

what

r u les"3s
ethical

for

21ttorneys

rules

apply

and
to

multijurisd iction.al, and now also transnational, legal acti vi.ties.

,, Sinct2 Rule l .l we nt into effecl, federal judges have shovvn a w•illinb'lless to
make use of i l to regul0te J ttorneys appeari11g before them. See, e.g., Victor H.
Kramer, Vicwiug Rule 1 1 as n Tool to l111pruve Profe.c.sionnl l\espo11sibility, 75 MINN. L.
Rt\'. 793, 793 (1991) (noting that ''[i]n lh� seven years since Rule 11 was arnended,
it h<lS gen�;r<1 ted well over a thousAnd judicial opinions"). On the other hand,
" [tlhe majority of ContinentC11 rules of civil procedure and lhose influenced by
thern impose no direct compulsory snnctions.'' Rolf Sti.irner, Tmns1rnlional Civil
Procedure: Discovery n11d Sanctiolls Against Non�Complinnce, 6 UNIPOJ<M L. REV. 871,
877 (2001). Fmnce, however, does allow for an "aslreinte," a type of proced urc d
fine, although the application of this principle is very rare in practice. Jd.
11> International <u-bitral tribunals do not necessarily enjoy the competence to
enforce national ethjcal rules. See i11jra notes 78-79 and accompanying text
(discussing how international tribunals often lack the rules or jurisdiction to
e n fo rce ethical conduct).
37 See mfrn Section 4.4 (discussing how to find the right agent to

regula te

lawyers 1nternC1honally).
38 Tbe purpose was specifically to make "as straightforward as possible"
which rules apply, a goal that is described by the Comments to the Rule as being
" i n the best interest of both clients and the profession." ABA COMM. ON ETHICS
AND PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 4 (1993). Professors Geoffrey Haza rd and William Hodes have argued
that making Rule 8.5 applicable to international law practice was done in response
to insistence by French professional regulatory authorities as a condition of their
recognition of Americun lawyers as consei/ juridique, or " j urid ica l advisors" in
English CEOHRF:Y C HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYEt{ING:
A H.ANliBOOK ON TrfE MODEl RULES OF PI�OFESSIONAL CONDUCf § 8.5:101 (2d ed.
Supp.) (1994). Others have questioned the authority for thts justification, which
does not a ppea r in ihe notes or comments. Daly, supra note 2, at 757.
.
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While several of the problems of Rule 8.5 only become apparent in
its .:1ppl ication,J<.l others are evidenl from its very wording.

These

ambiguous references appear to result principally fron1 the fact
that the Rule was written against the backgTound of assumptions
apply

that

in

domestic

contexts.

This

Section

exposes

the

conce p t u a l and interpretative problt"nls raised by the text of R u l e

8.5, whereas Section 3 w i l l take u p more generally whether the
substantive provisions of the Rule are appropriate for interncttion;:: d
a dvocates.

1.3. 1 .

A

Geogmplzicnl Location mut Etltical Rule::.

fundamental assumption u nderlying Rule

8.5

is that there is

a meaningful link between the place of adjud ic21bon and the
deci..sionrnaker's j L1risdiction.

This assumption is undoubtedly

predicated on the fact that such
domestic

U.S.

intended

to

court

systems

C1

where

However,

apply.

link is genera l l y present in the
no

Rule

8.5

comparable

was

originally

system;;�tic

or

meaningful link generally exists with international courts and
tribunals.
In domestic systems, the j u r isdiction of a court, and the identity
of advocates who

practice

before

it,

are

geographic realities o f where it i s located.

detern1ined

by

the

For exam.ple, the state

courts of New York are located physically in

New York, are

established under the Constitution of the State of New York, and
have j urisdiction that is predicated on (even if not strictly limited
by) the geographic boundaries of New York State. In this example,
as

with

all

national

courts,

the

identity

of

the

court,

its

jurisdictional mandate, and its place of operation are i nherently
interconn.ected

and

effectively

indivisible.

1vloreover,

unauthorized-practice-of-law rules affirm and reinforce the inter
relationship with place by requiring that all attorneys who practice
before a New York court are members of the New York Bar,
working in association with a lawyer who i s a member of the New
York Bar or admitted to the New York Bar pro hoc vice.40
39

This

These problems are discussed infra Section 3.

�o Specifically, Model Rule 5.5(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not practice law

in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R .
5.S(a) (2002). For a more thorough analysis of the rules restricting practice in
slates where attorneys are not licensed, see generally Charles W. Wolfram, Snetllcing
Around in /he Legal Pr�fessio/1: In te1:iurisdictional
Tnwsnctional L.muyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665 (1995).
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interconnectedness is a consequence of the fact thRt nation2ll courts
are instrm11ents of national sovereignty (or related political sub
d ivisions), which in turn is an jnherently territorial-be1sed
concept:H
The same i n ter-relationship \Vith place does not ordinarily exist
with either international courts or other in ternCi tionol tribunals.
Instead, with public international courts and tribunals, p rec i se l y
the opposite is true. �2 The physical location of most in tern21tional
tribunals is either an a rb i t ra ry choice produced through h i s torical
accident, negoiiation, and compromise, or a choice predica ted on
other non-substantive issues such as conveniencc.4' As. a result,
and in contrast to domestic courts, nonnallv the location of an
international tribunal is intentlonaJly and systemcttical l y unrelated
to the tribunal's jurisdiction and procedures, or to the presmYtptive
identity of the lawyers who appear before it:H This dc.tacbment
from the local procedures of the tribunal's geographic seal is one
feature that makes a tribunal " i n ternational."45 l t also means that
J

See Rog�:'r H .

Transgrud, Tin• Federal COT/1111011 Lnw of Pcrsonl!l Ju ri:;diclil'll, 57
849, 871-72, S72 nn.l'l6-20 (1989) (describing relationship
betwet:n original rules of jttrisdiction and rules of territorial sovereignty, and
listing e<trly cases that a ppro<tched jurisdiction based on international Jaw).
n For a diSCLtSsion of international arbitration tribunals and legal domicile,
see infra notes 48-54, and accompanying text.
-13 For example, the U.S.-[ran Claims Tribunal was located i n The Hague
because of the ready availability of the Peace Palace, suppart from the Dutch
government, and The Hague's history of netJtrality. See Michael I . Kaplan, Solvillg
11

CEO. WASH. L. REV.

tlze Pitjnlls of Tntpnrtiality whe1z Arbilrnting in Chilln: How tit!! Lessons of the Soviet
Llnioll mzd 1rnn

Ctm

Provide Solutions to Westem Parties ArbitrntiJI� in Chinn,

110

PENN Sr. L. REv. 769, 801 (2006) (attributing the success of the Tribunal to The

Hague's ''chronicled history of neuh·ality").
4-t There are some instances in whjch international tribunals have jurisdiction
over domestic crimes, which may imply the presence of lawyers from the relevant
jurisdiction. For example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a treaty-based
Tribunal that was established through a resolution of the U.N. SeCLlrity Council.
Jt is unique, and somewhat controversial, in that i t depends solely on substantive
crimes that are defined under domestic Lebanese law. See Nidal Nabil Ju rdi , Tlze
Subject-Matter Ju ri�dictio11 of the Specinl Tribunal For Lelumon, 5 J. lNT' L CRI:vl. JusT.
1125, 1126 (2007) (contrasting the Special Tribw1al for Lebanon with tribunals for
other nations such as Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Bosnia, among others) .
.JS There are also "hybrid international-domestic tribunals (such as the ad hoc
Court for East Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia)." Michael P. Scharf, FMwnrd: Lesso11s Fro1i1
The Sadrlanz Trinl, 39 CAS£ W. R.Es. j. JNTL. L. 1 , 1 (2006). Another recent example of
a hybrid international-domestic tribunal is the Iraqi High Tribtmal (IHT) in
Baghdad:
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U.S. 'lawyers practicing before the lnternabonal Court of Justice or
the Iran-U.S. Cla j ms Tribunal in The Hague do not expect to be
governed by the ethical rules applicable m local judicial
proceedings in The Netherlands.
This disconnect between place, ju risdictionr and legal
background o.f advocates seems to have been acknowledged, a l
least implicitly, by Ruthorities who might otherwise a t ternpt to
regulate attorneys appearing before international tribunals within
their j u risdiction.
Unauthorized-practice-of-law requirements,
which govern appearances in local com·ts and sometimes apply to
domestic
Rrbitrations,
most
often exempt
international
arbitrations.-+6
Meanwhile, no State has sought to inject its
professional regulation of attorneys into the activities of
international tribunals that might be located in their territory . .J7 As

The JHT merits characterization CIS an int-ernationalized domestic
tribunal because its stntute and rules of procedure are modeled on the
U.N. war crimes tribunals . � . and its statLtte provides that the IHT is to
be guided by the precedent of the U.N. ttibunals and that its judges nnd
prosecutors are lo be assisted by international experts. But the lHT fs not
fully international or even international enough to be dubbed a hybrid
court, since it is se<lted in Baghdad, its prosecutor is Iraqi, it uses the Iraqi
Criminal Code to supplement the provisions of its statute and rules, and
its bench is composed exclusively of Iraqi judges.
{i/,
•,r Even the California Supreme Court case that touched off the firestorm of
concern about multijurisdictional practice by finding that New York lawyers in an
arbitration in California were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
included r1 footnote exempting international arbitration hom its analysis. See
Birbrower1 Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court., 949 P.2d 1, 7
(Cal. 1998) (noting that the California Code of Civil Procedure permits parties to
an international cmnmercial dispute to either "appear in person or be represented
or assisted by any person of their choice," regardless of whether that person is
licensed to practice law in California or any other jurisdiction) .
.J7 In something of a histodcal oddity, some jurisdictions insist that party
representatives in international arbitrations be lawyers and, i n some more
unusual instances, that they be locally licensed lawyers. This latter requirement
can be understood as an assertion of jurisdiction to regulate attorneys appearing
in an arbitration within a State's territory, though today virtually all jurisdictions
have eliminated such rules. Sec Richard A. Eastman, Commetcial Arbitration 
Representation by Foreign Cou11sel- Lllegal Practice of Law in California, 94 AM. J. TNT' L
LAI,V 382, 403 (Bernard H. Oxman ed., 2000) (discussing the trend in many
countries of "liberalizing the right of representation"). Jn the United States,
several states have prohibited appearances by out-of-state lawyers in in-state
arbitrations as the "unauthorized practice of law." Tn other cases, they have
limited the number of arbitration appearances that are permitted. Somewhat
surprisingly, these controversial provisions usually contain exceptions for
international arbitration. This exception is odd since outside of internatione1l
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a result, international tt·ibunals operate as regulatory oases from
the perspective of local d isciplinc1ry authorities in. the terri tory
The fact t h a t national regule1tory
where they e1re located.
a u thoribes do 110t actively Jssert any i n terest i n the operations of
international tribLmals suggests thal these national regula tory
a·uthorities, whose nlles are supposed to a pply, have implicitly
rejected the choice of ethical rules :;elected by Rule 8.5.

fVloreovcr,

i t foreshadows the need for specialized ndes for these tribunals
and raises implicit doubh ,1bout the c1ppropriateness of usmg
territory-based choice-of-lcnv rules as a substitute.

2.3.2.

Where Does

a

Trilnnwl "Sit"?

Another textual a1nbiguity in Rule 8.5 is its equation of an
international tribLmar s legal s i tus with the place where i t "sits."
Under Rule 8.5, the ethical rules of the place where a tribunal "sits"

apply to a U.S. attorney's conduct i n com1ection with proceedings
before that tribunal.

Within the United States, the term ''sits'' is

uncontroversial because domestic courts o nly sit, and consequently

arbitration contexts, foreign attorneys are not allowed to peTfonn any other legal
activities without being licensed or obtaining permission to practice in the state.
St?e Steven C. f\:elson, A111cricall Bor Assodntion Sccfiall u{ fnternntional Law w1d
Practice Reports to the Housl! of Delegates, 24 INT'L LAW. 583 (l 990) (discussing claims
arising from international sale of goods); George A. Riemer, A State ofFlux: Trends
ill tlze Regulation of Multijurisdictional Pmcticc of Law, 64 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19 (2004)
(focusing on the regulations and the possible future trends and problems
regarding ternporary practice). Sec also r\BA Center for Prof'] Responsibility, Stote
Policies
(Mar. 3, 2009), available nt
Implementation
of ABA
MJP
http:// www.abanet.org/cprjmjp/recommedations.pdf (providing a reference
chart regarding various state rules); Stephen Gillers, it's an MJP World: Model Rules
Revisions Open the Door for Lawyers to Work Outside Their Home Jurisdictions, 88
A.B.A- f. 51 (Dec. 2002) (describing the revision of ABA Model Rule 8.5 as a
response to Birbrower). The exception for international arbitrations arguably
provides foreign lawyers greater rights than attorneys from sister states, who
should presumably be entitled to greater leeway, not less, than foreign attorneys.
The international exception essentially pennits foreign attorneys to appear in any
arbitration (since their participCllion wou.ld almost by definition sig11al the
international character of a case), whereas attorneys from other states can only
appear in some cases, namely those that are international. Other states have
similar rules. See FLA. BAR REG. R. 1-3.11 cmt. (2009) (''This rule applies to
arbitration proceedings held in Florida where 1 or both parties are being
represented by a lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or a non
United States jurisdiction . . . . Howe\'er, entire portions of subdivision (d) and
subdivision (e) do not apply to internalion<�! arbitrations.''),
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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have their "scat" or " legal donrici le,''-lt-: in one p lace.-19
international

tribunals,

arrangements, vvhich
tribunal

II

however,

then:�

are

a

With

diversity

of

make it difficult to ddennine where a

sits" w i t h i n the meaning of Rule 85.

InterT1a honal tribunals m a y " sit" i n one place, but have their

" seat" in another.

For example, the Statute for the In ternational

Tribunal for the Law of the Sea provides that the Tribunal has its

'/seat" in " t he Free a n d Hanseatic City o f Hamburg in the Federal
Republic of Ccxmcmy/' b u t 11 1l1ciY
elsevvhere

whene\' er

it

sit

considers

and exercise i t s functions
this

desirable.":>o

With

international ou blic law tribunals, such as the Tribuna I for the Law
'

of the Sea, the se pa r a ti o n of the tribunal's seat from the location of
actual hearings is rare, although not unheard oL

The same is not

true of i nternational arbitra I tribunals.
The ''seat" of an international cu-bilration is not simply a point
on a map, but i s i.nstead a legal concept that a t t aches a host of
important consequences t o the
award.

proceedings and the

resulting

As Gary Born explains, 1'the procedural law of the

arbitration is virtua\1v a!wavs the law of lhe arbitral state, which
..

.

governs both the 'in ternal' and 'external' procedural aspects of the
arbilration.''SI

For these reasons, i n terna tional arbitration

can

be

said to .have a I/ rootedness" to its seat52 that p ublic international

It is relatively com.m.on for
international arbih·al tribunals to hold hearings and meetings :ll1
tribunals do n o t generally hav e

·IS

.

1 GAI�Y 'BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1240 (2009)
(defining ''seat" to meCln "leg2l1 domicile" or "juridical ho1ne" and h·acing the
concept to relevant international conventions and national laws).
49 One historiet1l exception is that U.S. Circuit court judges and Supreme
Cow-t justices ''rode a circuit" fron1 court to court, which is where circuit couTts
got their name. For a brief history of a circuit riding, see David R. Stras, Why
Supreme Court Justices Slwuld Ride Agailz, 91 MLNN. L. REV. 1710, 1714-17 (2007).
;;o United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea annex VII, Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 1, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 (emphasis added).
st 1 BORN, supra note 48, at 1243. In the absence of party agreement, the law
of the seat can impose procedural and evidentiary requirements and prohibitions,
as well as provide default rules that act as gap fillers. ld. Meanwhile, the courts
in the arbitral seat may provide important functions in support of the arbitration,
such as facilitating arbitrator appointments (Clgain i n the absence of agreement),
ruling on arbitrator challenges, issuing interim relief or ordering documentary or
testimonial ev.ideJ.Ke. See /d.
52 fci. at 1250.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21
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places other

than the legal "sea t"53 _ jn a li teral sense, to " s i t " in a
place other than the a rbitr a l "seat." On some OCCilS ions, the "seat"
of an arbitration can be implied legally and di ffer entirely front
either the place identified by the parties or the place where the
hearings physica l l y tc�ke plJce.s .t In these (rare) circun1stances, the
language of Rule 8.5, vvhicb rdc rs to the place where tribunal
"si ts/' raises even more significant a m b iguities about how il i.s
i n tended to be applied in the context of arbilra l proceedings.
Ultimately, for reasons that are explained below/5 international
tribunals must develop their own ethical rules. It seems i n e v i table
that conscripting n21tional ethical rules into service be accepted i n
the short run as a tempora ry 1 second best solution. Even as c:t
temporary solution, ho·wever1 those rules should not be identified
based on the jurisdiction w here an international arbitration
tTibunal " s i ts/' but instead where i t has its ''seat." Otherwise, Rule
8.5 ascribes to the place where an a tribunal sits a n i m portance that
was never intended by either the architects of these tribunals o r the
parties appearing before them.
2.3.3.

Whnt "Rules" (�f C01zduct Apply?

Another ambiguity revealed tlu·ough the application of Rule 8.5
is that i t

designates the "ruJes'1 of the place where a tribunal sits.

I n the domestic context, the term " rules" would seem to refer to the
code of attorneys' professional conduct

in a sister state.. Arguably,

even i n the domestic context, this definition would be incomplete.
As several scholars have identified, 11 [t]he ru les and institutions

53

ld. at 1249. All lea ding institutional arbitration rules and many arbitration

stahttes have similar prov isions. See, e.g., LONDON CT. 11\IT'L ARBITRATJON R., cut.
16.2 (1998) ("The Arbitral Tribunal may hold hearings, meetings and deliberations
a t any convenient geographical place in its discretion; and if elsewhere than the

seat of the arbitration, the arbitration shall be treated as an arbitration conducted
a t the seat of th e arbitration and anv award as an award made at the seat of the
arbitration for all pu rposes. ) ; UI{ited Natjons Comm'n on J nt l Trade Law
[UNCITRAL], Arbitration Rules, G.A Res. 31/98, art. 16(2), U.N. Doc. A/31/17
(1976) ("The arbitral tribunal may . . . hear witnesses an.d hold meetings for
consultation among its members at any p lace it deems appropri ate, having regard
to the circumstances of the arbitration.").
5� F or example, an English court recently ruled that the legal seat of an
arbitration was England where the parties had provided for the application of
English procedural law, nohviths tand ing the parties' purported des ignat ion in
their contract of Scotland as the seat of the arbitration. See Braes of Doune Wind
Farm (Scotland) Ltd, v. Alfred M cAl pine Bus. Servs. Ltd. [2008 ) E W li C 426 (TCC).
55 Sec infm Section 4.4.
"
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controlling lawyers' conduct comprise a complex sy sten1''S6 thot

en1bodies not only eth ics rules embodied in codes, but also
stc1tu tes, procedural rules, i n herent judicial power, agency law,

criminal law, and tort l a w

.

'57

Thus, for exclmple, if t he California

Bar Court were to determine under Rule

8.5

that Nevada's rules of

conduct apply to a particular instance of a l l eged lack of d i ligence
and competence, it w i l l look n o t o nly to the Nevada Rules of
Professional Conduct/ but also to Nevada's bar association <: m d
j u dicial opinions interpreting and applying those rules, as w e l l a s
to proced ural r u l e s a n d

m a lp ra c

a n d context to those rules.

t ice standards t h a t give meaning

In other words,

i d e n tifying the

appl icable " ru l es"

of another jurisdiction is n o t a s simple as
opening a book to the page where its code o f conduct is written. ss
I n cross-border contexts, identifying the a p p l icable rules can be
much more d i fficult. As an initial matter, the codification of ethical
rules is a

relatively recent phenomenon and

not

all

foreign

j u risdictions have reduced their standCirds o f conduct to such
codes.59

Even i n countries that have written codes, such as

jfl

See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Tltl1 Relationship Bel1uew Civil Rule 1 1 nnd Lawyer
0 isciJ1!inc; A11 E111pirical /\naly::i� 5 uggesli 11X I /ISf itu tio11al Cleoices in the l�egula tion of
Lat11ycrs, 37 LOY. L. A . L. REV. 76 5, 7
97(2004).
57

Sec Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, R11/c, Stm�J, nn d Cmmnihnent in
38 Wtvl. & MARY L. REV. 145, 174 (1996) (examining

lhe Tenching of Legal Ethics,

strategies of legal ethics courses jn law school) .
.;s This observation reveals a larger problem: drafters of Rule

8.5

apparently

did not consider how its application to inter-state practice mjght be different from
international or transnational practices.

Important differences d o exist, however,

whicJ< have c.ritical implications for regulation of attorney ethics and conduct.
The ethical r·ttles of individual U.S. states are relatively homogenous because the
ethical rules of n1ost individual stales are predicated on the 1\BA's Model Rules.
As a result, there are only isolated, even if occasionally significant, differences
between the etlucal rules of state regulatory authorities.

More importantly,
because they are borne o u t of the same legal culture and operate in largely similar
legal systems, generally no one is rea!Jy offended, for example, jf an a t torney
abides by Florida confidentiality rules instead of Alabama rules.

SR By conh·ast, the ethic a1 rules among various nations, and the national legal

frameworks in which they exist, are considerably more variable than among the

ethical regimes of individual U.S. j u ris d ic ti on s As a result of these differences,
regulatory at.1 thodties i n different national jurisdictions may be profoundly
.

concerned if foreign attorneys violate local ethical norms, as illustrated by the
crirninalization of, and diplomatic protests against, certain activities by foreign
lawyers, such as serving process or taking depositions.

See supra note 15 and

accompanying text.
59 "ln most countries the rules governing lawyers are set by statute."

PIETER

t-l.F. BEKKER ET AL., AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L l., REPORT0f 1'IIE ASTL TASK tORG ON lNTl

PROF1L RESPONSJ131LITY 7

& n.19 (2007), m'nilnb!t: a/
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rules of p rofessional

cond·uct.''60 I t is unclear what role, if a ny, "unwritten rules" sho u l d
have if, for example, a U S . bar were applyjng English ethic2d rules
under Rule

8.5.

Even when a foreign jtnisd ict.ion has a written code o f conduct,
there are complex and del icate questions abou t how t o establish or
" p rove'' the precise content or i n terpretation of those rules.

When

fore"ign substantive lavv governs a particular issue in U.S. litigation,
it cannot simply be researched by the court, particulculy if the law
is i n a d ifferenl language 61

As a res u lt, i t is often presented

through experts/'2 potentially m u l tiple experts, who may disagree.
Ethics is an area where difficulties of proof are potentially even
more complicated than substantive law.

l n the United States, even

with respect to purely local

there are m u l tiple, often

practice,

overlapping or inconsistent bodies of rules that purport to regulate
paTticular a t torney conduct_63

When lhe rules are foreign, written

i n a foreign language, interpreted through foreign precedents, a n d
potentially i n troduced through competing experts, the room for
confusion and uncertainty may be considerable.
drafter of Rule

8.5

A t least one

expressed a p prehension about the d u e process

impl ications of ambigui ties regarding which rules a p ply.64

/ taskforcereporLpdf (citing Law No. 71-1130 of Dec. 3L 1971, Journal Officiel de
Ia Republique Fran�aise Q.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec 31, 1971, p. 167,
the Bundesanwaltsordnung [Federal Rules of Procedure], Jan. 15, 1959 BGBL 1 at
565 (F.RG.), and the Practicing Attorneys Act, Law No. 205 of 1949 Qapan)).
60 Maimon Schwarzschild, Clnss, Nntionnl Chnmcter, nnd the Bnr Reforms i11
Britain: Will 17tere Always Be nn £,zgln11d?, 9 CONN. j . INT'L L 185, 196 (1994):
61
See Louise Ellen Teitz, Fro111 lhe Courthouse in Tohc1go fo the l11femcf: The
Incrensillg Need lo Prove Foreign Law in U.S. Courts, 34 J. MAR. L & COtvL 97, 111
(2003) ("The problem is exacerbated when the foreign law is in another language,
and the court must either rely on a treatise in English or a tnmslation of a foreign
treatise.").
62 See id. at 107 ("The testimony of experts allowed to offer opinions under
the Federal Rules of Evidence often fom•s the basis for a court's determination of
the foreign law.").
63 As one joint committee by the ALI and the ABA concluded, "No area of
local rulernaking has been more fragmented than local rules governing attorney
conduct." American Law Institute-American Bar Association, Excerpts Franz
Special Study Co11Jerence of Federal l?.ulcs Govern ing Attorney Conduct Los Angeles,
Califomia fnnunry 9-10, 1996, Q247 A.L.l.-AB.A CONTINUING LEGAL Eouc 311, 333
(1996). As a result, the same report explains, ambiguities raised by the existence
of ambiguous and multiple bodies of overlapping rules h<�s "l!:!d t\J due process
and 'void for vagueness' challenges in increasing numbers.'' fd. at 343.
<""
Letter from David B. Isbell to Stephen Gillers (December '2, 1992), in
SusannB Fellem<m, Ethicnl Oil!?JI!IIIas nnd tl1c Mul ti�tnfl' Lnrcttcr: A Propost?d
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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front the potential problems of identifying and
interpreting rules governing p n r tic u lar conduct, there are also
questions about the role of social and custornary practices t h a t can
often alter the essential meaning of a rule. Consider, for example,
two recent empirical studies t ha t investigated professional conduct
in the United Stales and England. The studies evalua ted levels of
compliance with conflict of interest rules among An1ericcm lawyers
and English solicitors.r.5
Both systems operate in the same
l � m gL1age and originate from the same legal tradition, and
apparently have relatively similar detailed written rules regarding
such conflicts. When the results of the two studies are compared,
however, they scent to suggest that textual similarity conceals
significant divergences in their appl ications.o6 Apparently, U.S.
attorneys are 1nore fastidious in their efforts to comply with
conflicl rules, even when such adherence is contrary to their
business inteTests. Englisll solicitors, on the other hand, appear to
be more willing to bypass rules that are obsolescent or
counterproductive.
Various hypotheses may account for these disparate rates of
compliance, including differences in enforcement mechanisms,67 in
the likelihood of negative social sanctions, in client tolerance, in the
contpelitive structure of the legal services market, or in perceptions
of the possibility of genuine harm. Regardless of w h y these
differences exist, however, they raise important questions about
the complexities about how the regulatory authorities of one nation
can apply the "rules" of another. Could or should a U.S. state
supreme court or regulatory authority account for the social
A part

A111t!11dment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of Profession a l Conduct, 95

1500, 1515 n.l16 (1995) ( ex plai ning that an amend men t to Rule 8.5
would ''set out a relatively clear and sjmple set of choice of law rules'' which
would "be of considerable practical value to practitioners" ) .
65 See NaJ1cy J. M oo re, Regulating Law Firm Conjlict8 i n the 21st Century:
l111plica/io11S of the Globnlization ofLegnl Services and the Growth of the "Mega Fir/11,11 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (2005) (comparing ]ANINE GRrFFJTHS-8AKER, SERVING TWO
MASTERS: Co�Fucrs OF (NTEREST IN THE MODERN LAW FtRl\.1 (2002), witlz SUSAN
SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF 1NTEHEST IN LEGAL PRACTfCE (2002)).
COLUM. L. REV.

(>6

See id.

61

ln the Uni ted States, departure from the rule is likely to d raw a
disqu<1lification rnotion from opposing co�,msel. The United States is nearly
unique in p�rrni ttin g opposing counsel to raise motions for di squ a l i ficat io n, and
certai nly unique 1n allow i ng the d isq ual i rica tlon process to rise to the level of
l i tiga t ion strategy. Sec GRIFFITHS-BAKER, �upm note 65, at 77-78 (noting that
disqualification actions by attorneys gre\-v i n Europe with the arrival of U.S. law
firms}.
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context anct institutional functions of the Juthorities that would
apply the relevant foreign elhicaJ rules? For example, i n applying
English conflict o f interest rules, should a U.S. regulatory a u thority
take account of the fact that Engli�h a ttorncys are not actually
punished

for

certain

justi fication for Rule

types

of

viole1 tions?

The

underlying

8.5 seems to be that a lJ.S. advocate appearing

in proceedings in a fo rei gn ju risdiction should be regulated as an
a t torney from thst jurisdiction.

Literal application of foreign

ethicaJ rules, without regard to how they are i n terpreted and
applied by the national regulatory bodies, would alter - sometimes
dramatica l l y - the nature and meaning o f those r u lesY'

These

com.p lications in interpreting and ap�1lying foreign ethical rules
make it difficult for U.S. attorneys to accurately understand the
rules against which their condvct w i l l be m.e8surcd.

2.3.4.

Wliat is a "Mnttcr"?

The advocacy provisions of Rule

8.5

are predicated o n a model

that assumes that there is a single ''ma tter'' pending before one
" tribunal" for any particular dispute. While this may be a dubious
proposition in any large, complex domestic caser it i s certainly
faulty with regards to sizable international d i s p u tes. Various legal,
procedural, and strategic di fferences between national systems
create even more powerful incentives for parties to forum shop in
i nternational cases than in purely domesttc cases.69

As a result,

parties to the same international dispute often seek to litigate
simultaneously i n the courts o f two or more countriesJO Moreover,
i n the absence of transfer, consolidation, shared j urisdictional
precepts, and any international equivalent t o the Full Faith and
Credit Clause for enforcement of j udgmen ts, a transnational case is
more likely t o be l i tigated in multiple courts than a purely
domestic case.

Even within a single case, j udicial cooperation i s

often necessary, f o r example, to obtain discovery from foreign
sources or to enforce a final judgment in a foreign jurisdiction.
68 As David Wilkins has persuasively demonstrated, when domestic U.S.
institutions apply rules, they necessarily impose a "substantive tilt" that is the
product of their own instihltionetl history and objectives, as well as conceptual
and cultural biases. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 8 5 1 . The force of this observation is
amplified when the cultural and historical t,raditions of those institutions span
national and l inguistic boundaries.
<>9 GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CrVJL LITIGATION rN

UNITED STATES COURTS 521 (4th

ed. 2 0 0 7).

7
1 1 See id.
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Tbis potential for multiple courts to be involved in a single c;:1se
challenges the underlying rnodE:d on which Rule 8.5 is based, vvhich
contemplates a single " matter"
tribunal.

thal

is "pending before" one

An earlier version of the Rule had referred to the more

delimited term " p roceeding" (instead of

" matter").''l The

purpose

of the new language, acco rd i n g to the Ethics 2000 Conuniss.ion
Reporter's Explanation of Recommendabon, was to extend the

Rule so that it "control(s] from the moment the matter ca11 be said
to be before a tribunal (typically the date the case i s filed), even i f
no specific 'proceeding'
occurs.

" 72

that ''[n]o

is pending a t

Allhough th.e Rep orte r

change

'

s

the time the conduct

Explanation goes on to state

in substance is intended,"73 the new fonnulation

i1ppears to create an ambiguity in international cases.
Consider, for example, a case that is pending before the federal
district court in the Southern District of New York, b u l which
requires that a deposition be taken before (in effect taken by) a
judicial officer in Germany or Brazil.

In international cases

l i t igated in U.S. courts, Rule 8.5 would require that the professional
conduct of a ttorneys abroad is subject only to evaluation under a
relevant state's etlucal rules as long as that conduct was " i n
connection with"

a

case pending i n a U.S. court.

A s noted i n the

introduction, however, like many other countries Germany and
Brazil both ethically and legal1y prohibit attorneys from taking a
deposition o f a wi tness./4

The judicially

a d m i n istered deposition in

Germany or Brazil would not be considered a " proceeding" under
71 Although the term "proceeding'' is not defined i n the Model Rules, the
Canons of Judicial Ethics define a "pending proceeding" as a process that will
reach a "final disposition." See MODEL CODE OF juD. CoNDUcr Canon 3(B)(9) cmt.
(2003) (defining the phrase "pending proceed ing"). This definition comports with
other common definitions of " proceedings" as roughly equivalent to
"adjudication." See BLACK's LAW DICfiONARY 45, 1251 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the
terms "proceedings" and "adjudication").
n

Reporter's Explanation, supra note 21, at 830.

73 ld.
74 According to the U.S. Department of State:

Tlw Government of Brazil asserts that under Brazilian Constitutional
Law, only Brazilian judicial authorities are competent to perform acts of
a judicial nature in Brazil. Brazil has advised it would deem takjng
depositions in Brazil by foreign persons to be a violation of Brazil's
;udicial sovereignty . Such action potentially could result in the arrest,
detention, expulsion, or deportation of the American attorney or other
American participants.

U.S.

Dep'i
of
State,
Brm:il fudicinl Assistance (2009),
http:// lri.lvel .state.gov/ lcrw / info/judicia1/judicia l_672.ht1Yil .
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the form er version of the Ru le, whicl1 would make it easv to
J

determine that New York rules apply. Under the newly broadened
termi nology

,

however, the deposition would

a rgua bl y

be

a

" n.1.atter"7" that is "pendj11g'' i n th.e German court/1.1 and as a resul l
there would be lwo ''matters" that" are "pending" and the activities
of the lawyer in Germany could be said to be " in connec ti on with"
either or both of them.
By using the term " rnatter/1 Rule

8.5 does not succeed in c l ea rl y

ind i ca ting a s i ngl e set or ethical rules that a ppl y to given conduct.
Instead, it raises the possi bil i ty that

ru les

the

of rnore than one

j u risd ic tion may be appticd.77 The resulting confusjon u x1.dermines
the brightline guidance thCit Ruie

8.5 was su pposed to bri ng, even

if, as argued below, the very goal o f a single brightline rule for any
pa r t i c u la r case may itself be a

f121wcd obj ec tive.

2.4. Conclu!'ion
For activities

before

international

tribunals,

many

of

the

interpretive problems of RuJe 8.5(b)(:l) could be avoided if those
tribunals had their own ethica [ rules, which would then apply
under Rule 8.5(b)(2). Unfortuna tely, w h i l e the need for such rules
seems pal pable, only a few interna tiona 1 tribun al s have created
them.

The

International

Criminal

Tribuna]

for

the

former

Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), and more recen t l y the International Crjminal
Court/ have adop ted codes for professional conduct for attorneys
appearing before them.

The WTO Appellate Body and the

International Court of Justice have declined to take this step, whi l e

75 The Model Rules do not define the term "matter." Some rules do. For
example, the District of Columbia Bar's Rule of Professional Conduct l.O{h)
defines "matter" to mean "any litigation, administrative proceeding, lo bbying

activity, application, claim, investigation, arrest, charge or accusation, the drafting
of a contract, a negotiationf estate or family relations practice issue, or any other
representation, except as expressly limited i n a particular rule."
Under this
definition, the German court-supervised deposition would apparently constitute a
"matter.''

D.C.

BAR

R.

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

1 .O(h),

available

at

http:// www.dcbar.org/ for_lawyers/ efhics/legal_eth.ics/ rules_oLprofessional
_conduct/ amended_ru les/ rule_one/ ndeOJ_OO.cfm.
i6 Note that the text of Rule

S.S leaves uncertainly about which ethical rules

apply does not suggest that there should only be rules from a single jurisdiction
that governs an advocate's conduct.
17

Since the Reporter's Explanation indica tes that the change in terminology

was not intended to result in a substantive change, this Article sets aside this
ambiguity raised by the term "m<Jlter" and instead treats the current text as
effectively synonymous with the ec1rlier version of Rule
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i n ternational arbitnll tribunals and arbitral institulions (which
promtdgate the rules that govern arbitral proceed in.gs) do not
formally arti.cu late any standards of professional responsibility for
counsel.7S

To lhe contrar::,:, on some occasions arbitral tribunals

have affinnatively disclaimed r(;'sponsib i l i ty for doing so o n the
grounds that professionCI! rcgulcttion is non-arbi trable or beyond
the jurisdictional power of lhc trLbunaJ .7'� The next Part explores in
more detail the problems associclted w i t h applying national ethical
rules i n i n ternationC'll proceedings, as well as some of the problems
w i l h the current choice of lavv approach to regulaling attorneys
involved i n transnational l i tige� tion.
3.

FROM DRAFTL;�c 0EFt:CI S TO AWKW!\ RD APPUCA TIONS

The focus until now has been on ambiguities a n d conceptual
problems i n the text of Rule

8.5. This Section takes u p the more

substantive problems thai arise when Rule 8.5 is applied i n specific
contexts.

As expected, the conceptual problems m a nifested i n the

text are a m p l i fied i n a p p l ication of the Rule.

3 . 1 . Nntionnl Courts
There is only one instance i n which Rule

8.5

actually clarifies

the obligations of an attorney. That is in the relatively peri phera]
example o f dual-licensed attorneys whose primary legal education
and licensing is i n a foreign country, but who also hold a n

LLM.

7� As this A Ltthor has argued els�where, despite the formal absence of ethical
regulation of attorneys in i.nterna tiona! arbitration, such regulation inevitably
occurs;
Even if they remain unspoken, such perceptions of apparent misconduct
(or ineptitude) inevitably affect arbitrators' decisions on the merits,
cotnputations of damage awards, and assessments of costs and fees . . . .
These informal sanctions violate the most fundamental notions of
procedural fairness by imposing punislunents for violations of unknown
rules and without any opportunity to be heard. Such reactions to
perceived attorney misconduct might also be sanctioning a n innocent
Clients pay substantive awards, costs, and fees, but the
party.
misconduct may belong wholly to the attorney.

Rogers, supra note 15, at 376-77.
79

Award in ICC Case No. 8879, in HORACIO A. GRlGERA NAON, CHOICE-OF-LAw

289 RECUHL DES COURS 9,
159 (2001 ) (affirming that even if claims asserted against counsel for on� party for
ethical violations were within scope of arbih·ation clause, they would be non
arbitrable, because they concern "the criminal consequences of alleged advocate
misconduct").
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL CONhvfERCIAl ARBITRATION,
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ju risdiction

that perrnits

ci

secondary bar adm.ission in a

admission

for

foreign-educated

applicants.so

I t is estimC� ted Lha l most of t11ese foreign-educated
le�wvers work either on the transactional side of m u l ti-national law
firms, or return to their own country of origin, using the U .5. bar
admission as a credential (not u n l i ke the LL.ivf. degree i tselr).Sl I n
the latter instance, these attorneys m ci )' be appearing be fo re the
national courts o.f their home jurisdictions. Under Rule 8.5, these
attorneys would n o t be responsible few ab i d i n g by the ethical rnles
of tl1e U.S. jurisdiction from which they obtc:dned their bar
admission-nun-credential. fn this l i m i ted example, R u l e 8 . 5 seems
to have its truly desired effect of L' liminuting appJication of

e1

set of

ethical rules that hcwe little or n o relevance to particular legal

e1ctivi ties.

In other situa tions, the Rule effectivdy excuses global

advocates from exercising professional discretion regarding what
ethical rules to follow.

3.1.1.

Ethicnl Discretion i n Abiding hy Foreign Ethical Rules

One of the defining features of global advocates is that they
routinely engage in regulatory arbitrage.8:2

This p rocess requires

them to evaluate the I n ter-relative effects of parbcular rules i n
determining which ones can o r should apply t o a particular
situation .

This is a unique and valuable skill.

When it comes to

conflicting codes of ethics, however, Rule 8.5 excuses attorneys

so

See Howard A. Levine, Tire RegulntiVII OJ Foreign-Educnted Lawyers in New
York: The Pnst, Present, nnd Future L
�( New York's Role in the Regulntio11 of the
lntemntionnl Practice of Law, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 631 (2003). While not the
primary target of Rule 8.5, this group is not insignificant. TI1e number and size of
LL.M. programs have expanded in recent years, and as a result the number of
foreign-educated lawyers sitting for U.S. bar exams has increased. In 1992, 972
foreign-educated lawyers sat for the New York bar examination, while in 2006,
the number had grown to 3630. Co111pnre 1992 Bnr Exalilination Statistics, B.
EXAMINER, May 1993, at 23, 26, avr7iloble nt http:/ jwww.ncbex.org/fileadrnin
/mediafiles/downloads/Bar_Admissions/1992stats.pdf
(detailing the total
number of 1992 bar examinations taken by source of legal education), 1.oitlt 2006
Statistics, B. EXAMINER May 2007, at 6, 9 nvailnble nt http:/ jwww.ncbex.org
/ fileadmin/ mediafiles/ downloads/ Bar_Admi.ssions/2006stals.pctf (detailing the
total number of 2006 bar examinations taken and passed by source of legal
education).
Sl See Carole Silver, The Cn-:.e of lite foreign Lnwyer: lnfcrnationa/i:;; ing lite U.S.
l...egnl Profession, 25 FOHDHAM INT'r. L. J. 1039, 1 050, 1078 (2002) (describing the post
U.S. bar examination career trends amongst foreign-educated lawyers).
f;2 St>.P infra Section 4.2.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

[Vol.

U. Pa. }. lnt'l L.

30:4

from using this skill or Jrom exercising any professional discretion
regarding what rules apply to their condtlct.
Apart from dual-l icensed atto rneys with a foreign prim.ary law
degree,

CIS

described above, U.S.-Iicensed 21ttorneys rarely a p pear

i n foreign legal matters.

advocates

which they take part i n

R

ns

The most likely sltuation in

foreign proceeding is not as ad vocates,

but as experts on foreign

law or other

sui generis

roles.

For

example, U.S.-l icensed attorneys might participate in a deposition
taken before a .foreign j u d icial

officer, a.s described

above,

in

proceedings to request in lerin1 relief in a U.S. rnatter n1ade to a
foreign tribunal, or in proceedings to en force
abroad.

U.S. judgment

Zl

In any of these situations, the fact that these activities are

undertEd<en J'in connection with"

a

U.S. legal proceeding would

appear to mean, under Rule 8.5, that U.S. ethical rules would be
applied in any disciplinary action brought by a U.S. regu l a tory
authority. Since the conflict of laws rule in 8.5(b)(l) does not a d m i t
any

excephonT

violations

of

it

seems

foreign

to

ethical

instruct
rules

a u thorities

that

may

to

occur

d isregard
in

these

situa tions.s3
Even though Rule

8.5

would only subject U.S. a ttorneys to U.S.

ru les when activities are connected to U.S. proceed ings, it would
not preclude a n ethical " d o u blc jeopardy" or "double deontology''
problem if 21 foreign regulatory au thority, such as the German or
Brazilian disciplinary au thority in the example above, decided to
assert jurisdiction over a particular activity .s4
German bar would n o t apply Rule

8.5

f n that instance) the

and would more l i kely

directly apply German ethical rules to activities before a German
judge in a German court room, even if the activity was w1dertaken

SJ As described in more detail below, attorneys may still be accountable for
violations of foreign law under Rule 8.4. See infrn Section 3.1.2. Larger questions
about how and when U.S. lawyers should be ethically permitted or required to
violate foreign law are beyond the scope of this Article and will be taken up in a
forthcoming companion article, The Glolml Advocate.
s•

The doctrine of double jeopardy only formally applies with respect to
criminal proceedings within the United States.
The fundamental concern
underlying the doctrine-that an individual should not be subject to prosecution
by multiple authorities for the same underlying conduct-has an exception when
separate sovereigns are applying the sanctions. Sec United States v, Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (applying the constitutional practice of double jeopardy). The
<1ctivities of global advocates, almost by definibon, <1re subject to review by
�-eparate sovereigns. Thus, while the doctrine does not formally apply, the sam.e
underlying c:ono:'rn is present.
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in connection with a U .S . proceed ing o r " matter . " ss Apart from the
fa ct

that

d isciplinary

ac tion

by

foreign

bars

has

not

yet

ma teri alized, U . S . a ttorneys have other reasons to c o nform to
fo reign e thical rules, such as avoiding possible foreign criminal
prosecution or possible risks to the success of the legal a c tivity
i tself.S6 This exercise o f p rofessional judgn1 e n t, which experienced
global

advocates

i nevitably

already

undertake,

is

currently

obscu red and obviated by Rule 8.5. Whil e U . S . a ttorneys should be
encouraged t o consider and com ply with foreign e thica l rules, they
a re

instead

e thically

excu sed

from

even

considering

o ther

p o tentially relevant ethical rules whenever they can c l a im the
" c over" o f an overarching U . S. " ma tter " that occasioned the ir
overseas activities . Under this interpretation, even the adver tisin g
and direct solicitation b y U .S. attorneys o f Bhopa l victims i n
fla grant contravention o f Indian ethical rules would presumably be
defen sible t o the extent those ac tions are permitted b y U . S. ethical
ru l es . 87
3 . 1 .2 .

Criminal Acts and Prejudice to the Ad1rzinis tra tion of
Jus tice

Even though Rule 8.5 appears to permit a U . S. a t torney to
violate foreign law and professional conduct rules, that conclusion
does not necessarily end the analysis.

Model Rule 8 4 (b ) d efines
.

ss As noted above, regulatory authorities per se have not to date asserted
such interest, though some nations have imposed sanctions through their criminal
laws. See supra notes 46-47, and accompanying text.
86 F or exarnple, a German judge might not complete a judicially supervised
deposition if it is learned that U.S. counsel was improperly speaking to the
wih1ess.
87 Some activities by attorneys in Bhopal, most particularly direct solicitation
in the days after the disaster, appear to also violate U.S. ethical rules. See David T.
Austern, Is Lawyer Solicitation of Bhopal Clients E thical ?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 21, 1 985,
at 16 ("One W ashington, D.C., lawyer claimed to have signed contingency fee
agreements with more than 7,000 plaintiffs within five working days of the gas
leak - approximately one agreement every 60 seconds. " ) . To the extent that the
ambiguous reach of state bar jurisdiction at the time of the disaster p revented
formal disciplinary action, Rule 8 .5 p rovides a welcome mechanism for
monitoring and p rosecuting such abuses. The more delicate question is what
consequences should flow from attorney advertising in India that is prohibited
under Indian law, b ut permitted under U.S. ethical rules. Rule 8.5 would seem to
suggest that, as long as advertising is undertaken in connection with a U.S.
"matter," attorneys should not be concerned about being discip lined for violating
Indi an ethical rules. This outcome does not appear to be consistent with the spirit
or intent of Rule 8.5.
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that

in

other

any

honesty,
respects. " s s

" co n d u c t

that

is

prej u d i cial to t he a d ministration of justice" is a l s o p rofessional
misconduc t . �>9

If we asked the drafters of Rule 8.4 w he ther they

intended the terms " criminal acts" and " the a d rninis tra tion of
j u s tice" to include foreign l a w and syste ms, they w o u l d probably
rej ect the noti o n .
regula ti on,
practice.
requires

Ru l e 8 .4, a fter all, was drafted when ethical

i nc l uding

Rule

The extension
c onsidera tion

8 . 5,

was

still

of Rule 8 . 5 to

of

w hether

and

limited

to

transnati onal
how

to

d o mestic
practice

apply

these

p r o v isions beyond the U.S. syste m .
I f R ule

8.4

were n o t interpreted t o p rec lude a ttorneys fron1

v i o l ating foreign law, then R u l e 8.5 w o u l d seem to e t hi c a l l y excuse
v i o l a tions

of

foreign

Jaw

and

under taken i n c onnec tio n w ith

a

foreign

ethic a l

rules

when

U.S. matter.9o Moreover, if these

provisions of Rule 8.4 do not apply to foreign and international
l aw,

then U . S.

ethic a l

rules

raise

i mp o r tant

questions

about

interna t i o na l j u dicial c om ity a n d a ttorneys' ethic a l o bl i gation to
obey the law and con tribute to the rule of law.

Rule 8.5 would

transform a v i ol a tion o f foreign law from an uninten d e d mishap by
a n " accidental legal tourist"91 into conduct that is c on s i d ered

SS

8.4(b) (2002).
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4( d) (2002) .
90
This interpretation finds an analogue in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which imposes reporting obligations on attorneys 'Whenever they have
credible evidence of a " material violation of law." 15 U.S.C. § 7245. But " material
violation" is defined to mean a violation of " applicable U.S. federal or state
securities law . . . [a] fiduciary duty arising under federal or s ta te sta tutory or
common law, or a similar . . . U.S. or state law. A violation of foreign law is not
considered a ' material violation."' Stanley Keller, Implementing the S E C's S tandards
of Professional Collduct for A ttonzeys, SP018 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTIN UING LEGAL EDUC.
675 (2008). The complex issues of an attorney's obligations to obey international
and foreign law are beyond the scope of this Article, and will be taken up instead
in a future companion article, 17ze Global Advocate.
91 G lobal advocates can be considered "accidental tourists" because, for the
most part, U.S. law schools do not adequately prepare gradu ates to handle
international and transnational cases. The internationalization of the U.S. law
school curriculum is a relatively recent phenomenon. While there has been
significant irmovation in this area, there remain doubts about how well U.S. law
schools are preparing s tudents for international or global practice. See Carole
Silver, Advmtu res in Comparn tive Legal S turiies: S tudyin g Singapore, 51 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 75, 78 (2001 ) (" [D]espite the attention to internationalization and the
increased presence of international and comparative courses in the curriculum,
MODEL RULES O F PROF' L CONDUCT R .
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acceptable

aut horities.

or at

leasl

irrelevant

to
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U.S.

regulatory

This outcome seems to do as rnuch har rn to the

perceived i n tegrity of the U.S. lawyers as the underlying violations
th.er11sel ves.
Notwithstanding the an1biguities, it seen1s more l i kely thc:lt
Rule 8.415 provisions extend, c1t least prima facie, to foreign law
and foreign judkial systems.

State regulatory authorities have

appl ied Rule 8.4(b) to everything from driving under the influence
of a lcohol, to acts of domestic violence, to willful failure to file an
income tax form/ to .sexually ina ppropriate behavior,

to drug

posscssion .92 Com.mentators have suggested that the gravity of the
offense is less important when i t is related to the practice o f law.93
Under this reasoning, it seems u n l ikely that global advocates'
activities would be precluded from the purview of Rule 8.4 simply
because they i m p licate foreign laws.

After aU, their ability to

operate outside the U.S. legal system is the primary skill that g1obal
advocates market to their clients. Under this analysis, if Rule 8.4's
provisions are extended to international and foreign law a n d
foreign systems, then they appear to resurrect many o f the conflicts
that Rule 8.5 sought to p u t to resl.

3.2. Public Interna tional Lmu Tribunals
Rule 8.5(b)(1) is egua11y pernicious when applied to conduct
connected to international tribunals as i t i s when applied to
international cases i n national courts. Reference to "tribunals" was

there remains doubt that suificient numbers of U.S. law students are enrolling in
international and comparative law courses"). Law schools in most other countries
make international law a mandatmy course. Sec Liliana Obregon, The Colluding

Worlds of the Lawyer, the ScJwlar and the Polil.:ymaker: A View ujllllemational Law from
Latin America, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1 45, 150-51 & n.20 (2005) (comparing the role of

international law in law school curricula in Latin America, Europe, and the
United States).
n See, e.g., People v. Meier, 954 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Colo. 1998) (concluding that
"any practicing attorney would know" that as king a prospective and obviously
vulnerable divorce client about the size of her breasts would "adversely reflect on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law"); La·wyer Disciplinary Actions, ARK. LAW.,
Summer 2001, at 40 (2001) (attorney disban-ed for violation of 8.4(b) for conviction
of two violations of Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE Act"));
Lawyer Disciplinary ActioHs, ARK. LAW., Summer 1997, at 37 (1997) ("use and
possession of illegal drugs constituted "a criminal act that reflects adversely on [a]
lawyer's . . . fitness as a lawyer'' in violation of Model rule 8.4(b)'').
93 See Thomas H. Moore, Cmz Prosecutors Lie? 17 GEO. ). LEGAL ETHICS 961,
971-72 (200t1) (suggesting that various jurisdictions have approached this 1natter
in different ways).
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specifically in tended to extenJ the Rule to non-jud icial se t ti n gs,
such as international arbitral tribunal s.•,l-1

Obliging U . S . attorneys

w ho appear before internaticn1al courts, international tribunals, or

international cu:bitration triblmals to ad here to the n.:des of the pl a ce
\\:here such tribunals "sit" v i r l u a l l y ensures that U.S. attorneys w i l l

ble tn
be bound b v rules that are d i f ferent from tho�e anDlica
ll
�

opposing

counsel

and

wholly

u n related

to

the

proceedings

t h e m se l ves.
Consider, for exan1p le , what effect Rule 8.3 would have on
proceedings befo re the International Court of Justice, vvhich sits i n

The Hague. This location w a s chosen because the Netherlands is a
neutral jurisdiction a n d a faciLity was made a v c1 i l J b l e to the Court
by the Ca rne gie Foundation, which owns and ctd m i n isters tlle
Peace Palace. No.ne of the members of the Tribunal are necessa rily

Outch.95 Neither Dutch law, nor Dutch procedure, nor the D u tch
bar, nor even the Dutch l a n g uage has ;:my consistent relationship
with, or

e ven

relevance to, proceedings before the Court.%

Under

Rule 8.5, hovvever, a n Arne r ica n a ttorn ey appearing before the lCJ
would be charged with understanding and a b i d i n g by

Dutch

ethical rules, which are written in Dutch (though also available in
English)97

and

proceedings.

designed

to

apply

in

Dutch

lega l

Moreover, thjs resul t is only half of the p rob lem .

Non -l a wyer representatives are permitted to

'14

domestic

a p p ea r,

b u t would

Ser supra note 27 and accompanying text.

115

The CoLJJt is composed of fifteen jLtdges, who are elected for terms of office
of nirte years by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security CounciL
Altbottgh sonH� Dutch judges have served, it is neither required nor common for a
srnall country like the Netherlands to have a judge on the court. Sec Statute of the
lntemntional Court of Justice, Chapte1· I : Organization of the Court art. 2-33, June
20, 1945, 59 Stat 1062, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, avnilable at http:/ /www.icj-cij.org
j docw11ents/index. php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_1 (ex pia i ni ng that judges
are elected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of
persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration).
96 The official languages of the lCJ m:e English and French. Jd. art. 39. lt Is
possible that, on occasion Dutch lawyers appear before the ICJ, just as Dutch
jlldges may be appointed to it, though thei.r appearance is a matter of coincidence
rather than part of an established or systemic relationship. Sec, e.g., Mark S. Ellis,
The Evolution of D�feuse Counsel Appenring Befort! the lnter11.ationa/ Criminal Tribunal

37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 949, 959 (2003) (describing the high
profile trial of Ousko Tadic and hmv, "Professor Michail Wladimiroff, one of the
Netherlands' most respected criminal lawyers was assigned as lead counsel for
Mr. Tadic").
97 Netherl ands Bar Ass'n, Legi�laf'ion, Rules and Regulo/it'IIS, ll'i'l1ila[lh: l1f
http:/ 1 www.cldvocatenorde.nl/ english/legbhlthm/vademecu m.asp.

for the Fonuer Yugoslavia,
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not be required to abide by D u tch ethical ru les.9S

Similarly,

attorneys who are licensed in some j u risdiction other than the
U n i ted States, where there i s no Rule 8.5, would not be bound by
Dutch ethical rules.99
As this example demonstra tes, application of R u l e 8.5 to
international tribunals has the pernicious effect of injecting a third,
wholly

u nrelated

set of ethical

obligations

into

international

proceedings, thus further splintering the existing ethical divide.
Meanwhile, for all the reasons analyzed above, U.S. regulatory
a u thority w i l l encounter considerable difficulty in i n terpreting
D u tch ethical rules, or applying them in proceedings before the

ICJ, where they were not intended to apply.

3.3.

International Arbitration

As noted above, Rule 8.5 m.eans that U.S. attorneys appearing
in an international arbitration are bound by the ethical rules of the
jurisdiction in which the arbitral tribunal "sits."

Even i f the

terminological

satisfactorily

problem

of

"sit"

and

"seat"

is

addressed through interpretation, there remain questions about
whether it makes sense to bind attorneys, and as described below,
arbitrators, by the ethical rules of the arbi tral seat, and whether
national regulatory a uthorities are the institutions best suited to
regulate professional conduct in international arbitration settings.
The former set of questions w i l l be addressed i n this Section,
whereas the latter set of q uestions will be taken up in Section

3.3.1.

4.

Llnevening the Playing Field and Pre-Empting Client
Prerogatives

Some o f the oddities involved i n applying the ethical rules o f
the seat of public

international

tribunals

also apply

to

the

international arbitration context and, a t this point, i t i s worth
taking a closer look at some of their implications.

One of the

consequences of linking ethical regulation to the seat (or where a

98

See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Americanization of International Litigation, 19
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 89, 115 (2003) (noting that the lCJ does not require party
representatives to be licensed attorneys and referring to "the stateless community
of public international law lawyers").
99 For example, the applicable CCBE rule is 1nore limited. See CCBE CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 4.1 (2006). ("A lawyer
who appears, or takes part in a case, before a court or tribunal must comply with
the rules of conduct applied before that court or tribunal.")

OHIO ST.
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tribunal ''sits") is that it virtually guarantees that opposing counsel
in the same proceeding will be abiding by different rules since
other regulatory authorities do not have si111ilar conflict of lavv
rules. For exan1ple, in a proceeding sea ted in Texas betwee11 an
American and a Mexican party, the U.S. attorney would be subject
to strict U.S. rules regarding conflicts of interest, but the Nlexican
attorney would not be. The Mc'<ican attorney instead would ]jkely
operate under a presumed obligation (or a professional instinct)lllO
to abide by Mexican conflict of interest rules.
On the other hand, if the arbitration were seated i n 1Vlexico,
under Rule 8.5 Mexican conflict rules would apply to the U.S.
Clitorney. Although not entirely clear frorn rny own research, it
appears that Mexican conflict of interest rules would permit n1any
types of representation that U.S. rules would deem. to be
impermissibly con.flicted. 101 As a result, a U.S. attorney appearing
in an arbitration seated i n Mexico would apparently be ' ' liberated''
from U.S. conflicts of interest arising from that representation,
perhaps to the surprise of an unsuspecting client or former client.
Under those rules, the U.S. attorney is apparently permitted to
engage in representation that would be considered conflicted
representation under U.S. rules, and would give rise to related
concerns about protections of confidential information. The injury
from the conflict and potential disclosures or misuse of confidential
information will likely be borne by a U.S. client, even though that
party likely entered the original representation with expectations
that U.S. ethical rules would continue to protect its i nterests into
the future and presumably never consented to the conflicted
representation.
3.3.2.

Regulating Arb-itrators Below the Radar

Buried i n the third note of the Reporters' Explanation of Rule
8.5 ("Note 3") is yet another extension of the Rule that so far seems
to have been overlooked by attorneys and com.n.1entators.
Specifically, Note 3 of the Reporter's Explanation provides that:

iOO

Even if Mexican ethical rules do not purport to apply directly in

international arbitrations seated in Mexico, an attorney licensed there will
generally comport her conduct to those standards by which she ordin.arily abides.

101

For an analysis of why the United States has what are regarded as

uniquely
Catherine

"persnickety"

A.

rules

regarding

attorney

conflicts

of

interest,

see

Rogers, Regulating lnternntionnl Arbitrators: A Funclion.al Approach to

Developing S tn�� cltmis of Conduct, 41
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Lawyers who participate (n [arbitration and other methods
of forn1ally adjudicating the rights of parties], whether

ilt.'lllmls

os
as party rt:'p resentofiiJes, should be bound. by the

or

Rules of Profess ional Conduct of the jurisdiction in which
lhe tribunal sits or by the rules of the tribunal itself if they
otherwise provide. 1o2
Although this provision is not part of the actual text of the
Rule,

or

even of the official Comme11ts, it s·uggests·a rather radical

extension of Model Rute 8.5 to activities of attorneys when they act
as

arbitrators.
This extension has two important i m plications, which are dealt

w i th i n turn below.

First, a t a procedural level, Note 3 subjects

a ttorneys' conduct when they act as arbitrators to oversight by the
bar t h a t licensed them as a ttorneys. Second, a t a substantive level
Note

3 implies that the rules that will be applied to their activities

as arbitrators are the same rules that apply to them when they act
as attorneys. Bot}l of these assumptions are questionable, and raise
significant concerns for international arbih·ation practice.
The apparent rationale for Note 3 is that when a ttorneys act as
arbitrators, they do not cease to be l icensed by the relevant
regulatory a u t hority, and they should therefore still be bound by
its ethical obligations and subject to its disciplinary jurisdiction.
There are some reasons for this linkage.

Even ii acting as

arbi trators, attorneys are argLtably providing a form o f "legal
services."

Moreover, the ethical obligations of arbitrators and

a t torneys seem to bear at least a s uperficial resemblance to each
other.

A ttorneys must be free from conflicts of interest, just as

arbitrators must be free from bias.

Attorneys must conduct

"conflict checks" before accepting representation, just as arbitrators
have a " d u ty to investigate" before accepting an appointment.
Despite this superficial resemblance, however, the role of
a d vocate i s fLmda1nentally d i fferent from the role o f arbitrator1
even if both roles can be performed by the same person. As Carrie
MenkeJ-Meadow points out, " [o ] u r conventional rules of ethics are
particularly inapposite when lawyers serve i n quasi-judicial roles
as arbitrators

.

.

.

.

''JOJ

Attorney ethics were developed to guide and

Reporter's Explanation, supra note 21, at 830 (emphasis added).
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics a11d Professionalism i11 Non-Adversnrial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 162 (1999); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Lawyer as Co11sensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 71
(2002) ("When the purpose of the lawyer's work is to facilitate an agreement that
102

1U3
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regulate conduct of individuals acting as advocates o n behalf of
cJients. Applying them directly to other activibes can o n l y lead to
confusion. 1o4

Attorney ethical rules do not apply when attorneys

serve i n roles such as Little League u m pires, law school lecturers,
governmental

officials,

and

perhaps

most

tellingly,

judges.

Instead, there are specialized rules to regulale their activi ties in
those roles, just as special rules have been developed Lo guide and
regulate arbitrators. tns
Even if it is agreed that the content o f attorney ethical rules
should not be superimposed over arbitrators' activL ties, there is
still a separate question of whether regulatory authori ties may
nevertheless be an appropriate regulatory body to e n force the rules
that are appl icable. Perhaps the most forceful argument in favor o f
having

regulatory

a u t horities

perform

this

function

is

that

currently there is n o regulatory body that purports to be able to
regulate, or provide ethical oversight for, arbitrators.

As one

scholar has wryly noted, " barbers and taxidennists are subject to
When arbitral
far greater regulation than larbitrators]. "l06
institutions and courts preside over challenges to arbitrators

or

(in

the latter case) allegedly bias-tainted awards, they assess the effects
of alleged

misconduct

and

provide

a

remedy

to

potentially

aggrieved parties.1°7 They do not, however, directly regulate the
arbitrators themselves.

The fact that arbitrators a l s o generally

is acceptable to all parties rather than to attempt to maximize the individual
client's interest, conventional lawyer ethics rules have scant relevance.'').
104 Nevertheless, some courts and commentators have unwisely atten1pted
just that. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (tying an
arbitrator's obligation to investigate possible conflicts of interest to her status and
ethical obligations as an attorney); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When AOR Is Ancillary

to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Conjro11t Conflicts Issues, ALTERNATTVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Dec 1994, at 147 ("Applying this rule lregarding

conflicts of interest] to (mediation]1 a law firm engaging in ADR practice must
observe the rules of ethics- particularly the rules concerning conflict of interest
in the ADR work and the other practice, considering them as a single practice.'').
105 See Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of T11ternntio?1al Arbitrators, in THE
LEADING ARBITRATORS' GUJDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Lawrence W.
Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2008) (giving an overv iew of the "proliferation of
specialized codes of ethics and rules intended to guide and govern arbitrators'
conduct").
106 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil fuslice, 47 UCLA L. l�EV. 949, 1013 (2000).
1 07 However, review of arbitral awards is not only an indirect assessment of
alleged axbitrator misconduct, but also a particularly unemic one.
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enjoy i m m u ni ty fron1. civil liability tor misconductiOB means that

c1rbitrators

pre

insu lated

frorn

virtually

a]]

m.echanisms

that

formi d l y regulate lawyers, other t han repu tational sanctions and
reL:1ted market consequences. 1 °'J
Some might argue that this regula tory vacuum should be filled
by national bar associations, even if they are n o t upplying the same

rules that apply to a t torneys. This rationale is c l e<:ul y what led to
the development of the proposed Mode! Rule of Professional

CC>licluct of the Lawyer as Third f"larty Neutral,liO which if a d o pted
would provide that s pec i a l set (A rules. W.bjle this effort should
c lea r l y

be

dcHnestic

a.pplauded
arbi trators,

as a useful developn1ent
its

arbitrators remains du bious.
that other don1estic efforts at
in ternational arbitrators. J 1 1

utility

in

regulating

in

regule�ting

intcnlational

This pojnt is ill ustrated by the fact
regu l ating

<1rbitrators usually exempt

U n l i ke domestic arbitration, there are numerous, multi-cultural

and overle1pping sources that may a ffect the n a t u re of arbitral
proceedings and hence the function and professional oblige�tions of
international arbitrators. If natjonal regulatory a u t horities become
the primary i n terpreters and enforcers o f these various sources,

w� Arbitrators generally enJoy some it:vel of irnmunity from civil claims
arising ftum their role as <tn arbitrator. The scope and extent of that immunity
mBv vary between countries and arbitral institutions. See Susan 0. rranck, The
Liai1ility uf lnteruntional Arbitrators: A Cvntparntive Analysis and Proposal for Qualified
fllllllUility, 20 N.Y.L. SOL ) . lNT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2000); 2 BORN, supm note 48, at
'1652-61.
W'l Clearly, the threats of professional embarrassment and negative publicity
have an effect on arbitrator conduct. Most ethics commentators agree, however,
that reputational sanctions, particularly in a rapidly growing field, are not
sufficient to regulate professional conduct. Cf Larry E. Ribstein, Ethics Rules,
Agency Cos1•s, and Law Finlt Slntcture, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1726-27 (1998) ("Though
these rules may not give rise to civil liability, the threat of disciplinary action and
the possibility that ethical rules may provide standards of conduct in liability
actions give ample incentives for lawyers to adhere to etl1kal rules.").
·1w The proposed Model Rule is a product of a joint undertaking by the
Center fot Public Resources and tl•e Georgeto·wn University Law Center, which
was drafted for adoption into the Model Rules for Professional Conduct. CPR
GF.Ot�GETOWN COMM'N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS IN ADR, MODEL RULE FOR T�E
LAWYER AS TlllRD-PARTY NEUTR1\L (2002.), n<)ailnblc at http://www .cpradLorg
/Portals/0/CPRGeorge-MocleiRule.pdf.
J I I Catherine A. Rogers, The Vvcatiu11 of flu: /utewntiona/ Arbitrator, 20 i\M. U .
l:'-!T'L L . REV. 957, 1014-15 (2005) (discussing various efforts to regulate domestic
arbitrators and the problems of extending those regnh>tions to intcrnatione�l
,;lrbitra tors).
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just as they are with attorneys, t n the risk i s that enforcernent efforts
w i l l lead to greater frCigmentation and incoherence instead of

coherence

and

consensus,

u nclenn ining

the

efficacy

of

international arbitration.

4.

RECCLAT!NC ATTORNEYS

It TRANSNA"f'!ONAL DiSPUTE

RESOLUTION

The first Sections of this Article have exami ned chal lenges
inherent i n regulating global advocates and the lin1itations of Rule

8.5 and other current a t tempts.

This final Section

considers

broader and more prescriptive questions of bow global advocates
should be regulated. To thRt end, this Section chal lenges the basjc

approach and underlying assumptions of Rule 8.5. I n Section 4.1, I
argue against an omnibus choice-of-law rule, such as Rule 8.5, i n
favor o f rules that prescribe d i f ferent choice-of-law s o l u tions for
d i fferent types of attorney conduct.

Recognizing that limitations

w i l l exist even with n1ore refined choice-of-law provisions, Section

4.2 emphasizes the need to leave room for a measure of a t torney
discretion in cases where violations of foreign law o r ethical rules
may be justified.

l explain in Section

stopgaps like Rule 8.5 cannot provide
they

leave

open

in1portant

Cl

questions

4.3 that conflict-of-laws
final alterna tive because
about

how

to

define

attorneys' ethical roles and obligations when they are detached
from any particular legal system.

Section 4.4 argues against

application of national rules in proceedings before international
tribunals and urges that such tribunals adopt their own ethical
rules. Finally, in Section

4.5,

with respect to enforcement, I argue

that home licensing authorities axe not institutiona l l y adept to
enforce unfamiliar ethical rules applied to activities that occur i n
far off and distant proceedings.

I propose instead that these

authorities work in cooperation w i t h their foreign counterparts
and international tribunals to effectuate discipline i d e n tified by
those bodies under applicable rules.

4. 1. Moving Beyond One-Size-Fits-All Analysis
Conventionally, conflict-of-laws analysis seeks to i d entify a
single legal rule that applies to specific conduct, based on an
evaluation of the contacts of the actors involved and the cmnpeting
interests of the relevant sovereigns whose territory is implicated i n
11�

See sttpra Section 2.3.3.
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those contacts.m

To that end, con.flict-of-lcwvs analysis usu a lly

classifying a s peci fic factual situation under " the
o pp ropria te legc: d ce�tegories and specific rules of la w. " 1 l -l Rule 8.5
defies this a n al y s i s . Instead, the Rule replaces Cl specific factual
situation or event vvith the broad ca tegory of " a dvocacy before a
tribuna l.''113 Rather than parse out individual rules, Rule 8.5
begins by

prescribes substitution of an e n t i re, rnonolilhic code of leg21l etl·lics
that is determined by the physic(ll locaU011 where that tri bu nal is
loca ted.
Ap art from being anom.alo us to t rad i tional conflict-of-la\,VS
analysis, this approach leads to d is t u r bing resu l ts because n o t all
ethical rules that would be subst itu t ed o u t by application o f Rule

8.5 are limited in their effect to the immediate proceedings .

For

cx.:�mple, as noted above, Dutch ethical rules would apply in a

proceeding before the Iran-U.S. Cia ims Tribunat.n6
would perm.il a U.S.

These rules

a t torney to engage i n what

would be

considered conflicted representation be fo re an arbitration seated in
Mexico, even though the brunt of the confJjct would be borne by
another client who is not party to the current proceedings or who
entered the representation agreentent wi tho u t understanding that
the ethical protections existing at that time could be substituted
out.

Conversely,

as

noted

above,

the

Rule

also

implicitly

a u thorizes continued violations of fo reign ethical rules whenever
t h ey are coru1ected to a U.S. malter.

Under Rule

8.5,

th erefore,

attorney advertising in Bhopal and pre- tes ti mon ial communication
w i t h German deposition w itnesses would s t i l l be permitted despite
being unethical (and potentially illegal) in the host countries.n7
In related a reas, other conflict-of-laws regi1T1es have taken a
For exa1nplej i n the
more careful and constructive approach.
context of jud.icial procedures, conflict-of-laws analysis separates
out individual p roced ural events and specific activities, each of
wh.ich receives its own particu larized analysis regarding which
legal rules should be applied. Under this approach, the provision
1n See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.1 (4th ed. 2004);
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WlLLlAM L. REYNOLDS, Ui\fOERSTANDlNG CONFLICT OF LAWS
1-3 (3d ed. 2002). There are of cours8 other schools that diverge from this more
conventional approach, arguing that choice of law should not be jurisdiction
selecting.
1P RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 cmt. b (197'1).
115 MODEL RUu:.s OF PHOF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2002).
t t o See suprn note 16 and accompanying text.
n� Sec suprn note 83 and accompanying text_
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of notice, the exchange of p le<ld i.ngs, lhc Lrja.l itself, and - within
trial proceedings - ev e n burden of proof and questions of witness
competence and
analysis

uedibility,

regarding

which

each

receive

system's

their

rules

own separate

clp p ly . I I S

This

individualized analysis is necessary because for each procedural
stage,
the factors relevant to selection of an ,� rnDl ic a bl e r u l e mav
'-....

.l

.�

have different weight, depending on the purpose of a particular
rule and the interests a ffected by the activity. 119
This approach is not inevitable i n legal ethics, as denwnstrated
by

the U . K .

corollary

to Rule

8.5,

the Solicitors

Regulation

Authority's ("SRA' s") Rule 1 5 regarding " overseas practice." 1::!0 Tn
place of Rule 8.5's terse directive, SRA Rule 15 l.1as an extensive
preface that explains how its various provisions apply.

It then

slogs through the each of the rules in the Solicitor's Code of
Conduct, ptoviding individualized guidance about the application
o f each to activity abroad.

Notably, U . K . confidentiality and

conflict o f interest obligations continue to apply to activities
abroad, but the U.K. prohibition again&l contingency fees does not
apply to representation in foreign jurisd ictions.

A s a result, SRA

Rule 15 ends up with much more salient results than Rule 8.5,
partic u l a r l y regard i n g rules that protect clients and third parties
who are not directly involved i n the relevant " n1atter.1' As Rule 8.5

liS See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COl\!Fl...JCT OF LAWS §§ 123-139 (1971)
(highlighting the variety of different issues that require choice-of-law
determinCition ).
IW Section 6 of the Restatement (Second ) of Conflict of Laws provides a good
summary of the factors t ba t are generally considered i n determining which rules
shoLtld be considered to determine the applicable rule of law:

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systerns,
(b) the relevant polic ies o f the forum

,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the pa r tic ula r issue,
(J) the protection of justified ex pectatio ns

,

(e) the basic policies w1derlying the particular field of Jaw,
(f) ce rtain ty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTAT[MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 {'J971).
120 See SOLICfTOHS REGULATIOi\: AUniORITY [SR/\j CODE OF CONDUG R. '15
(2007) (providing the rules regarding overseas practice, ranging from conflicts of
laws to fee practices ) .
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21
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is reconsidered, a t a m i n i m u m, Its application should be more
carefully modulated and tailored to f i t specific �thical rules.

4.1. Regulatory Arbitrngc and Profe�:;;i onnl Discrelion
Another unpleasant side effect of Rule S.S's omnibus approach
to conflict of laws i s that it cornpletely obviates the need for
attorneys to exercise any professional judgment or d iscretion in
selecting applicable rules.

Rule 8.5 in1plicitly authorizes attorneys

to violate - with ethical i m p u n i t y - foreign la\N (at least under one
possible interpretation) t 2 t a n d ethical rules l22 They are granted
this

free

obligation

pass

to

that

disregard

they

spend

foreign
even

e1

provisions
moment

of

without

any

professional

reflection to assess the value of the activity to the case or the
relative importance of the foreign law or ethical rule being
violated.

To be sure, attorneys may sometimes be justified in

violating

forej �,

law,

particularly

ii

the

foreign

law

would

significantly impede or prevent a just result i n a legal proceeding
that is not exclusively subject to that nation's laws.123

While a

violation can sometimes be justified, exercise of discretion i s
necessary

to

determine

its

propriety

Notably, both SRA Rule 15 and Rule

2.4

in

an

individual

case.

of the CCBE use language

that s u ggests that attorneys can and should engage in some
evaluative process .124

n1

See supra Section 3.1 .2.

(suggesting

that one interpretation of Rule 8.5
rules when
u nderta ken in connection with a U.S. matter, an d noting the harmful effects on
U.S. attorneys' perceived integrity).
would ethically excuse violations of ioreign law and foreign ethical

m

As noted above, this is because in any U.S. matter, U.S. ethical rules would
This i nterpreta tion assumes that other ethical rules, such as Rule 8.4, do
not separately impose an obligation to abide by foreign law or ethical rules. For a
apply .

discussion of Rule

8.4, see Section 3.1.2.

m

Cf Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm LLC, 524 F. Su pp 2d 332
2007) (reasoning that jt was far from clear that New York had a public
policy against compelling individuals to violate foreign law, in this case a forei gn
injunction against enforcing an arbitration award). The extent to which attorneys
can or should be able to vi ol ate foreign law is beyond the scope of this Article and
will be taken up i n a future article, The Globnl Advocate.
.

(S.D.N.Y.

nq Speci fica l ly , Article 2.4 of the CCBE, entitled ''Respect for the Rules of
Other Bars and Law Societies," provides:

When practising cross-border, a lawyer fron1 another Member State may
be bow1d to comply with the professional rules of the Host Member
State. lawyers have a d uty lo inform themselves as to the rules which
will affect them in the performa nce of any particular activity. Member
organisations of the CCBE are obliged to deposit their codes of cond uct
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Another failing of the onu1ibus approach o f R u l e
cases

like

the

Blwp a l

d isas te r,

Ind ian

a nd

lavv

prohibi ting a dvertising or solicita tion could be,

8.5

is that in

ethical
and

r u l es

arguably

should be applied, despite the fact that the adjud i c a tion is located
in New York. Similarl y, putting aside for the moment a mb i gu i ties
about the d efinition of " ma tter" d escribed above, Gennan ethical
rules prohibiting pre-testi monial communication could a p ply to a
dep osition being taken in Berlin for use in a c a s e pending in
California . Rule

8.5

would apply to make the same b o d y of ethical

rules apply to all these areas, in apparent disregard of Indian and
German interests. 1 25

Such an indiscriminate

a p proach

is

not

necessary.
SRA Rule

8.5,

incl u d es a provision to

allow s ol icitors to comply with local law.

Specific ally, it provides

15,

in contrast to Rule

that " if compliance with any provision of these rules w o u l d result
i n your breaching local l aw, you may d isregard that provision to
the extent necessary to comply w i th that local law . " 1 26 This rule
does more than simply r ej ect Rule 8.5' s tacit appro val of violations
of foreign e thics and law.
app ears

to

p ermit

By using the word " may," SRA Rule 15

a ttorney

d iscretion

in

resolving

conflicts

be tween the SRA Code of Conduct and foreign l o c a l law .

In a

similar vein, though in a d ifferent fran1ework, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure

4

permits,

under

certain

circums tances,

service

of

process in violation of foreign l aw, but only after a j u d ge has
eval uated whether such a c tion is justifi e d . 127 Jud i c i al supervision
over intentional violations of forei gn l aws or ethi c a l rules may be
an

alternative

way

to

ensure

that

such

violations

are

duly

considered and justi fi e d .

a t the Secretariat o f the CCBE s o that any lawyer can get h o l d of the copy
of the current code from the Secretariat.
CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

art. 2.4

(2006) .
1 25 Notably, India, Germany and other countries are sti l l able to prohibit
these activities and prosecute attorneys who are caught violating these
prohibitions. Within national systems, however, violations of law and rules,
particularly those related to law practice and the integrity of the justice system,
are us ually also regarded as ethical violations as provided in Rule 8.4.
1 26 SRA CODE OF CONDUCT R. 15.01 (2)(c) (2007).
127 Those circumstances, most notably, include an order from a Federal
District Court judge directing such service. See FED. R. C!v. P. 4(f) (3) (stating that
service may be effected in a place not within any judicial district of the United
States by other means not prohibited by i nternational agreement as may be
directed by the court).
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f n de ter min i n. g whether violation of a foreign rule is justified,
.

of

one

the

most

i mp o rta nt

conflict-of-laws analysis

considerations

wo u l d

under

traditional

the tvvo rules are

be whether

si mply i nconsistent or whether th�y directly conflict.

Conflicting

rules exist when the rule from one systent requires what the other
system forbids, ra i s in g problems tha t are distinct from those raised
by rules that aTe me re l y inconsistent. The problem here is that

zm

a t torney is compelled by one system to do something that another
prohibits.

system

1nescapable

The

double

conflict,

deontology

in

other

words,

problen1

that

creates

an

entails

an

Lmavoidable risk of professi onal discipline, though not necessarily
in lhe attorney's home jLuisdiction.

By way of a concrete example,

consider a letter by a French attorney to a U.S. a t torne y that is
marked confidential, bu t exp l a i ns the conditions under which her
client

would

agree to settle.

Under French ethical

rules, a n

Clt torney receiving such a conul1tmication would b e prohibited
frOJJl sharing the letter with her cl ient, but under the U.S. ethical
ru les, a recei ving attorney would be required to conununicate the
letter to her client because .it contains a settlen1ent offer.12s

It is

impossible for the attorney to co m ply with both rules because they
directly confl ict.

In that instance, allowing or even requiring the

attorney to violate the foreign ethical rule can arguably be justified.
With rules that are mere.ly inconsistent, where there is no direct
conflict, permitting violations of foreign rules or law may be Jess
justifiable.

Witb inconsistent rules, one system permits (but does

not require) w h a t the other system prohibits. In that situation, the
attorney is not facing a Catch-22, but rather a potentially strategic
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. Given a choice, the a t torney
would typically prefer the rule that permits, or even requires,
conduct that is most adva nta geo us for the client. For example, i n a
deposition in Germany for a U.S. litigation, the U.S. a ttorney
would

likely

prefer t o abide

by

U.S. rules

that permit pre

testimonial communications, particularly if the other side's counsel

were bound by the German prohibitions against such prohibitions
and the judge d i d not find out. fn its cur rent form, Rule 8.5 could
be read as relieving the U.S. attorney from any obligation to even
consider whether such pre-testimonial communication violates
German

ns

law

or represents an affront

to a German sense of

See MODEL RULES OF PROP'L CONDUCT R 1.4 & cmt. (2002) (establishing the

U.S. requirernent for client participation in the 1·eceipt of any and all settlement
c.omJnunications).
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fairness.

But

with

lhis

and

other

examples

o£

inconsistent rules, a n attorney could comply with both rules a t the
same time. Accord ingly, i t is not clear why, in the absence o f son1e
compelling circumstance, violation of a foreLgn r u l e should be
countenanced under R u le 8.5.
foreign ethical
justification

rules

should

or

To the extent that a violation of

law can be justified,

regLtirc

the exercise

the

process of

of discretion,

or

as

s u ggested above, j u d i c i a l oversight, to evaluate the need for a
particular procedure against other factors, such as the i n terests of
the State whose laws or rules w i l l be violated.
4.3. Ethics in [nternaliollal ProccediHgs

The quandary underlying the ethics of attorneys who appear
before international

tribunzds

is

not

so rnuch

a bo u t

double

deontology or finding which set o f national r ules should govern.
I n s tead, it is about matching the ethical rules to the attorney's
particularized role in that context, and freeing her from otherwise
conflicting national rules.
International tribunals alter the roles of the advocates who
appear before them.129 I n perfonning these ne-vv roles, the national
ethical rules of those attorneys may become obsolete, if not
inapposite.no

The pull of national ethical obligations remains

strong, however, because the a ttorneys arrive with preconceived
notions of their role that were shaped through an amalgam of
elements from their national systems.13 1 Meanwhile, many of the
formants that shape attorneys' national conceptions of their role
simply do not exist, or do not exist to the same extent i n
international contexts.

129 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 15, at 407 ("[T]he interreJational functional
roles of actors in the international arbitration system . . . are assigned by the
procedural anangements of international arbitration and . . . reflect the
underlying cultural values of the international arbitration system.").
130 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Alternafive Dispute

Resolution: New Issues, No Answers fmm the Adversary Co11ception of Lawyers'
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997) (providing an overview on the

difficulties of applying the ethics rules meant to govern lawyers in adversarial
contests in the alternative dispute resolution context).
131 Cf Judith A McMorrow, Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in
International Tribunals: A Case Study of the lCTY, 30 B.C. 11\ff'L & CoMP. L. REV. 139,
146 (2007) (describing how legal education, malpractice standards, market and
informal social controls, and applicable mechanisms of self-regulation shape the
ethical obligations of attorneys jn. domestic contexts).
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As described C'lbove, i n ternationf!l tribunals are detached from
any one nationa.l legal system.

As a res u l t, these tribunals do not

have t h d r own cultural traditions cmd established malpractice
standards in the same sense that t h ese features exist i n national
systems. They have procedu res and customary practices, b u t these
procedures are n1uch newer (and in most cases less developed)
than equIvalent proced Lu·es in national cou rts.m For these reasons,
some commentalors have argued that i n ternational tribunals do
not need (or cannol have) t.hcir own ethicwl ru les, but should
inste8d

rely

on

choice-o£-la w

national ethical rules should

principles

a ppl y . t :>3

to

determine

which

vV hile a conflict-of-laws

a p p roach has the appeal of tapping into well-established and
i n s t i t utionally grmmded rules, national legal ethics cannot provide

mecmingful guidance when tlle essential mle of a n advocate h a s
cbanged becaLLSe they are operating i n
procedural and cultural context.

a

significantly different

Instead, w h a t is needed for

attorneys to fully appreciate and function in their new role is
retraining

or

re-acculturation

into

lhe

relevant

in ternational

system, and pertinent ethical ru-les to guide and facilitate that
process.
Son1e international tribunals have developed their o w n ethical
rules tJu·ough a combination of pragmatism C�nd re-accul turation.
Practice before international tribunals is a distinctive " blend of
international and domestic concepts and procedures, req uiring
w1ique skills, experience, knowledge, strategic sense and training .
.

.

. ''n�

Since national legal trainin.g does not generally prepare

attorneys for practice before in ternational tribunals,ns professional
t31 This observation is most true with respect to certain so-called public
international law tribunals, but less tru e with respect to international arbitration,
which is often touted as contributing to the development of international
procedures. See John R. Crook, Fnct-Findi11g in the Fog: Determi11ing the Facts of
Uphenuals and Wars in Ilzter-Stnte Disputes, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 313 (Catherine A_ Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009).
B::l See e.g., Ki rs ten Weisenberger, Peace is Not the Abse11ce of Conflict: A
Response to Professor Rogers's Article 'Fit Aud Function ln Legal Ethics,' 25 WIS. lNT'L
L]. 89 (2007) (arguing that extant rules of conducts are adequate for the purpose
of regulating international arbitrations, and a conflicts of laws approach is the best
option).
134 Rich<Hd ] Wibon, Assigned Defe;rse Counsel i11 Domestic nnd ln tenwtio11nl
Wnr Crimes Tribunals: The Need .for n Strucfurul Appronch, 2 INT'L CRIM. L REV. 145,
147 (2002).
ns This is less true today with the prolileration of international moot court
competitions to accompany the proliferation of intemational t i bu na ls themselves.
While the Jessup Moot is the oldest moot, the new investment arbitration, and the
.

r

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

[VoL

Ll. Pa. f. lnt'l L

1 078

30:4

competence often requires re-a.cc u l t u ration and re-training that
reshape an attorney's perception of their role as Gl domestic
attorney into their distinct role as

C1

global advocate.

One of the most prominent examples of re-accul t uration and its
relation to ethical norms i s the ICTY. The ICTY i s made of twenty
five judges

fron1

twenty-three

d ifferent countries

and

" [ t ] he

defense bar of the JCTY has 257 members, drawn from m u l ti p l e
legal traditions, w i t h roughly half of t h e defense bar from lhe
former Yugoslavia . . .

.

'' Dr,

As port of their participation in ICTY

proceedi.ngs, attorneys are explicitly re-trained a n d cul turally re
orientated i n order to develop professional and social norms that
are essential to perforn1ing the role assigned to them by the ICTY.
As

1:1

shorthand, this retra i n i n g can be

summarized

as taking

" lc ] i v i l and common law lawyers" and reorienting them to the
"new hybrid trial model [of the [CTY] a n d their role w i t h i n that
model.''137 A l l attorneys at the ICTY nndergo this re-orientation. T t
has been particularly important, however, with respect to Soviet
era trained lawyers, who viewed the ro]e of the criminal defense
lawyer as an enemy of the state. '1 3S
Once the role of a ttorneys before the ICTY was established,
new ethical norms appropriate to the new role were developed and

International Criminal Court Moot also offer students opportunities not only to
address international arguments undet' international procedures, but also to argue
ngainst law students from other countries. For example, the Vis International
Arbitration Moot draws over 200 teams from around the world to Viem1a, and
sixty-five teams to Hong Kong for the Vis East. See Fifteenth Ammal Willen1 C.
Vis International Comn1eTcial Arbitration Moot 2007-2008 Registered Teams,
http:/ jwww.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ntoot/particip<mtsl5.html (last visited Apr.
lO, 2009); Sixth Annual Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration
2008-2009
Registered Teams, http:/ I wwvv .cisgmoot.org
Moot (East)
/ ParticipatingTeams.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). " [P]articipation in the annual
Willem C. Vis lnternational Con1mercial Arbitration Moot Court as a student is a
way of 'marking' oneself to the seasoned members of international conunercial
arbitration as destined for greatness in the field." Benjamin G. Davis, The Color
U11e in International Commercial Arbitration: A n American Perspeclive, 14 AM. REV.
[NT'l. ARB. 461, 516 (2003); see a/so THE VtS BOOK: A PART!Cli'ANlS GUIDE TO THE
WILLEM C. VTS INTERNATfONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION MOOT (Janet Walker ed.,
2008) (demonstrating that international moot court experiences have become so
popular as to support a commercially available guide for participants).
136 McMorrow, suprn note 131, at 148.
1)7 !d.
ns Mark S. Ellis, supm note 96, at 957 (2003) ("Many of the 'qualified' non

western attorneys were trained in the communist/ socialist era, in a system that is
antithetical to the Tribunal's substantive nnd procedural laws.'').
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eventually codified .Bq

" [t]here

A l l this occurred despite the fact tha t

was no shared h i s tory, background, or cul ture to help

detennine

the

best

course

of

nclion . " t.w

Despite

this

re

accu l t u ration a n d related new ethical rules, a ttorneys at the TCTY
s t i l l remain reluctant to er1gage in conduct thal violates their home
ethical norms. The reason is t h a t most national ethical rules do not
provide guidance similar to Rule 8 . 5

so

lhut a t torneys are (or

believe they are) still bound by Lheir home ethical rules when
appearing before the ICTY . 1 � 1
A

similar

process

of

j)rofessional

socialization

and

re

orientation has occurred in i n ternational arbitnHion. For example,
when

U.S.

arbi tration,

a t torneys
they

communications
practice

was

first

often

with

began

engaged

their

appearing
in

in

international

systen1atic

party-cippoinled

ex

parte

arbitrators.

This

considered acceptable in domestic U.S. arbitration 142

1 39

See id. at 966-68 (outlining the devehJpment of the ICTY Code o.f
·
Professional Conduct).
1 �0 Sec McMorrow, supra note 13"1, at 148.
l n See id. at 142-43 (noting that the tension between home ;:�nd fCTY ethical
rules is aHeviated In practice by providing two or more defense counsel who can
assign tasks am.ong themselves based on their home jurisdiction rules); see also
Ellis, supra note 96, at 959 (noting the strategic "pairing" of defense counsel).
t-12 See, e.g., Lifecare Int'l, inc. v. CO Medicai, lnc., 68 F.3d 429 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that an arbitration award, whicb vvas based on arbitrators' determination
that parties had entered into binding settlement agreement even before agreement
was reduced to writing/ was not "arbitrary and capricious."); Sun kist Soft Drinks,
Inc. v. Sul'lkist Growers, Inc./ 10 F.3d 753, 760 {11th Cir. 1993) (finding no
misconduct despite finding that party-arbitrator met with representatives and
witnesses of appointing party before arbitration to plan strategy); Drexel
Burnham Lambert lnc. v. Pyles, 701 F. Supp, 217, 220 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("The
appearance of impropriety alone i s insufficient; a party seeking to vacate the
award must establish facts that create a reasonable impression of partiality,").
These cases involved domestic U.S. arbitrations, which rneC\ns that these
objections did not arise because of conflicting cullu.ra] perspectives on ex parte
communication. H should be noted that even in the United States, these practices
have met with significant criticism. See, e.g.,. james H. Carter, lmproving Life with
the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clenrer Conduct Guidelillesfor "No11 Neutrals," 11 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 295 (2000) (discussing non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators vis
a-vis neutral party-appointed arbitrators); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in
Arbitratio11 nnd Related Dispute Resolution: Wlznt's Hnppenhzg and Wlwt's Not, 5 6 U
Miami L. Rev. 949 (2002) (reviewing the ethical issues in arbitration); Andreas F.
Lowen.feld, Tlze Pnrty Appointed Ar/Jitrntor in lnlernatiollal ContrClversies: Some
Reflectiorls, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 59, 60 (1995) (noting that such partisanship among
arbitrators is not the norm in intern11tional arbitration). Recently, i n response to
this problem, some institutions have clarified their arbitr<ll rules to reflect that all
arbitrators are expected to etct as "neutrals." See, e.g., LONDON CT. INT'L
AI�BITRATION ARBITRAL R. . art. 5.2 ( Ali arbitrators conducting an arbitration under
11
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and i n some other cm1ntries, but rather abhorrent i n international
arbitration
l i m i ted

practice

generally,

comn1Lmication on

which

deems

pcrn1issible

procedural matters.H3

only

Through a

process of social re-orientation within the arbitxation community ,
a n ethical norm against most forms o f ex parte comnmnication has
emerged.

This norn1 is followed in rnost cases and i s now
incorporated into various arbih·al rules and codes of ethics.L4..J
I n another exa1T1ple, th.cre was a notable gap i n perceptions and

practices about extensive pre-tes timonial prepara tion o f witr1esses
in international arbitration, as with the .ICTY_1.t5 Skepticism about
pre-testimonial

conu11wl.icalion

is

n1ost

pronounced

among

lawyers from civil law traditions. For example, Gern1an attorneys
cue

generally

prohibited

from

engagjng

in

pre-testimonial

communications with witnesses i n German judicial proceedings.
German a t torneys in i nternational arbitration practice, however,
have professionally re-oriented and developed a new norm of

these Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and independent of the

p.:nties; and none shall act in lhe arbitration as advocates for any party.").
14:<

See

lNT'L BAR ASS'N [JBA] R. Of' ETl:-I ICS FOR [NT'L ARB! rRt\TORS, art. 5.3

(stating arbitrators should avoid "nny unilateral communications regarding the
case" and to inform the other p<�rty of its substance if it occurs),
discussion of ex parte

conu1mnication

in

international

For extended

arbitration,

see

W.

W. PARK, & J,'\N PAULSSON, lNTERNATJONAI. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION § 13.07 (2d ed. 1990); M. Scott Donahey, The lmtependenc:c
and Neutrality ofArbitrators, 9 J. TNT'L ARB. 31, 41-42 (1992).
LAURENCF. Ci�AIG, WJLLJAM

14-1 AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

ASS'N

[AAA)/ ABA

ARBITRATORS IN COivL\IIERCIAL DISPUTES Canons

CODE

Ill(B)(1)

OF

ETHICS

FOR

(penTiitting ex parte

communications with any rnernber of the arbitral tribnnal concerning such
matters as setting the time and place of hearings or making other arrangements

for the conduct of the proceedings)i Jd. Canon liJ(B)(l)(b) (permitting ex parte
conununica6ons by party-appointed arbitrators as long as general disclosure is

made); ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TNTET<NATIONAL
CoMtvJt.RCJAL ARBITRATION 225-26 (1991) (noting that "it is not unusual for there to
be discussions with just one of the parties in respect of procedural matters such as
availability for future hearings").
1-!5

See Nicolas C.

Ulmer,

Etlzics and Effectiveness: Doing Well by Doing Good, in
1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE
ARBITRATORS 167, 171 & n.8 (Geoffrey M. Beresford

THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO }UST!CE: THE
CHARTERED lNSTITUTE OF

1996) (noting that i t is not an unconunon practice for one arbitrator to
Tlze
Practicalities of Cross-Cultuml Arbitration, i11 CONFLJCTING LEGAL CULTURES IN
COMMERCIAL ARBLTRA TION: OLD IssUES AND NEW TRENDS 79, 86 (Steian N. Fromme!
& Barry A. K. Rider eds., 1999) ("Contacts ex parte after all arbitrators have been

Hartnell eel.,

communicate with the appointing party); Ambassador Malcolm� Wilkey,

selected and assumed their duties should be forbidden.
not."),

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21
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professional conduct that treats such comrn u n ications as ethically
permissible in the internnt.ional arbitration context.t-16
These

developments

signal

that

profe ss i o n a l

norms

for

inletTta tional tribuna]s arc not only possible, b u t also critically
important to the fetir and effident functioning o f proceedings. I n
the absence o f forrn a l l y developed and codified codes, such norms
a re emerging on an i n fo r m a l and ad hoc basis. While this a ppears
to

be

a

positive

development,

it

is

not

A t torneys' home ethical ru les continue to ca s t

withoul
a

problems.

"shadow" that " i s

omnipresent for the IZt wyers and j u d ges,''117 in p a r t becatlSC the
prevalence of international rules over national rules is not well
understood.
While these ethical ''improvisations" may provide an essential
stopgap before formal international ethical rules are cod iJied, they
also have some serious drawbacks.

wrost importantly, they can

mask continued or new d i v isions, and they can evade established
enforcement mechanism.s. For examp le, the new, unwritten ethical
norm pennitting Germc-m a ttorneys to engage i n pre-testimonial
comnumication i n international arbitration does not prescribe any
limitations on this new e n terprise, and i t has not been formally
acknowledged or regulated by Gerrnan bar a u thorities.
Without cu1y express new rule to substitute for the r u l e that has
been displaced, the German attorney arguably has

more

latitude

than the American a t torney in pre-testimonial communications.
An American attorney is still bound by U.S. ethical rules that

establish the limits of proper witness preparation,l4S even i f those
limits can be " permea ted by ethical uncerta inty.'' 149

Those U.S.

ethical Hmita tions, however, may not be obvious.

A German

l a wyer, originally shocked by pre-testimonial conu11tmications,

14o Sec Bernardo M. Cremades, Overco111ing tl1e Clnsli of Legal Cultures: The Role
of Interactive Arbitration, in CONFUCf!NG LEGAL CULTURES, suprn note 145, at 147
(suggesting that arbitrators must distingLtish the cultural background of part ies in
order to effectively preside over proceed i ngs to which pa rt i es come with differi ng
ap proa ches to pre-testi mo ni a l communication with w i tnesses); Lucy Reed &
Jonathan Sutcliffe, T!Je "Al/lericnllization" of InternntiOillll Arb it mtion ?, 16 lNT'L ARB.
REP. 37, 42 (2001) (suggesting that while some consensus has emerged about the
possibility of preliminary commtUlica tion with witnesses, there ret'nains conflict
as to the extent permitted).
147 McMorrow, S/1]11'11 note 131, at 142.
1.JS See Bennet t L. Ge rs hman, Witness Cotlclling by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 829 (2002) (providing an overview of witness prepara tion in the United
States).
1�9 j ohn S. App lega te, lt\lili iCSS Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 28l (1 989).
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might reasonably infer that U.S. attorneys operate with no l i m its
whatsoever in p re-testim.onial communications.
This clSSLltTtption would

find considerable reinforcernent i n

popular portrayals of U.S. attorneys. For example, i n the 1958 fi l m
Anato111y of

11

i\l[u rder, a congenial but cynical defensl! attorney

played by Jimrny Stewart describes the legal defense to m. urder to
his client in :;uch a way that his client is jnspired to " recall" the
facts consistent with t h a t defense.l �u

While it n1akes for good

ciJ1ema/ t21lking to "a w i tness Rbout the law or about desired
testimony before seeking the w i tness' own version of events comes
dangerously neM [criminal] subornalion of perjury/'l51 and i s
generally consid ered a Lransgression o f U.S. ethical rules.152

The

German altorneyr hovvever, has no reason to know about these
l i m i tations and no obligation to abide by them.

As a result, even

with this ethical innovation designed to level the playing field,
attorneys in the same proceedings may still operate u n d e r d i fferent
rules.

Making matters worse, these clashes may be even more

concealed and nwre difficult to discover than when the d ifferences
were between fonna l, express and written rules.

Finally, these

newj u n w ritten rules are, by design, outside of formal national
enforcement regimes.

This escape hatch raises separate and

important questions about who should enforce a p plicable ethical
rules, which is the topic o f the next Section.
Rule 8..5, and arguably also A r ticle 2.4 of the CCBE Coder
acknowledge the i mportance of international tribunals having their
own ethical rules that trump otherwise applicable national ethical
rules. These concessions, however, have had l i mited value because
to date few i n ternational tribunals have actually enacted codes o f
ethics for the lawyers who practice before them. Tn the meantime/
the tug of national ethical rules has collided with the very practical
need for international ethical rules.

cri tique of Jimmy Stewart's technique, see Richard H. Underw ood,
Pe�;ury! Tire Chnrges nnd tire DejeHses, 36 DuQ. L. REV. 715, 781-82 (1998).
ISO

For

a

151

CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETt TICS § 12.4.3 (1986).
Peter A. joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Witness Preparation: Wlzm Does 1t
The Line? 17 CRIM. Jusr. 48, 49 (2002) ("At the same time that the lawyer is

152 See

Cross

required to thoroughly 1nvestigate and persuasively present the facts on behalf oi
his or her dient, both the criminal law (md ethical rules prohibit the lawyer from
presenting false t�stirnony.").

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21

2009]

LAWYEI\.5 vVl THOUT BORDERS

l 083

4.4. W/1o 5/wuld Regulate Glolml Advoc111'e� ?1:13

The assumption underlying Ru lc 8.5 is that, wherever i n the
world a global advocate open
1 tes and wha tever rules apply, the bar
association that originally licensed the attorney should be the

primary, if not sole, au thority that reg·ula tes her. This conclusion is
based on two assllmptions.

The first asswnption is that the bar

association Lhot has licensed the attorney has the greatest stake in
ensuring

the attorney's

professional

conduct.

The

licensjng

association cle21rly has a d i rect interest in enforcing the rules it has
promulg21ted and upholding the i n tegrity of t hose professionclls i t
has licensed.
dim inished

The force o f these in terests, however, may be

when

the

misconduct

occurred

overseas

violation o f foreign ethicc1l rules t=u1d foreign law.

and

in

A second

assumption is that only the licensing bar has the power to i mpose
professional sanctions, including disbarment. Particul a r l y i n l i g h l
of some o f the problems described above,'154 however, there are
reasons to question whether national regulatory a u thorities are
particularly compelent to perform this task.
Apart from the conceptual difficulties in interpreting and
applyi11g

foreign

ethical

problems.

procedural

r u les,

H.ow

there

CCH1

are

local

also

practical

regulatory

and

a u thorities

conduct disciplinary proceedings and factually assess whether
misconduct

is

present

when

the

relevant

events

p hysically, culturally, and politically far away?

authorities

should

not

be

excluded

from

occurred

While licensing

regulating

global

advocates, this Section argues that they should not be the fronl line
regulators.

Instead, they should work in coordinated efforts with

international and foreign tribunals to assess and enforce penalties
for ethical transgressions that are identiiied a n d evaluated w i t h
foreign. and i n ternational tribunal and regulatory a u thorities.
National regulatory authorities exist and operate in domestic
political and legal contexts.

This national orientation inevitably

affects their ability to apply foreign or international ethical rules,
whose content may be both difficult to discern and contr21ry to
regulatory authoribes' o w n institutional sense of proper attorney

condu ct.

For example, would U.S. disciplir1ary a uthorities be

inclined to p u nish a U.S. a ttorney for " i m properly" preparing a

m

This title is borrowed from David R Wil kins' seminal work: !Nl!o

Rcgulnlt: Lawyers? Se!! Wilkins, supra note 9.
15·1 See ;;up rn SecLion 2..3A.
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witness when French ethical rules arc deemed to apply under R u le

8.5, even though such conduct V':ouJd otherwise be ethically
penTtissible or required under U.S. rules? Would U.S. a u thorities
condemn a U.S. attorney for disclosing information to a client t h a t
w a s unequivocally valuable to that client, b u t w h i c h

foreign

a

syslern required be maintained as "confidential"? Al ternatively, is
it possible to imagine a french bar association disci p l i n i n g a
French

a t torney

for

unethically

withholding

discoverable

documents when no such offense exists i n France and France has a
tradition
1
discovery? 35
historical

of

being

hostile

to

the

very

notion

of

Regulatory a u tl1orities are not a l l- p u rpose macl1ines into which
a set of ethica I rules CC\n be i n p u t at one end and a disi nterested
disciplinary decision applying those rules is produced a t the other
end.

Like the lawyers they adm.inister, the individuals who staff

regulatory C1llthoril1es arc products of a local legal c u l ture.156 Their
legal history, backgro und, and training necessa rily color their
perceptions about the propriety of atto.rney conduct and their
interpretation o f rules a p p l ied to such conduct.157

When filtered

through national regulatory a u thorities, i nternational and foreign
ethical

rules

perspectives.

The

legal

will

be

refracted

am.biguities

through

inherent

in

these

legal

national

translation

described above15s will increase the potential for distortion.

A

similar phenomenon has a l ready been observed a s substantive

155

Fran,ce, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, and
Canada have all enacted blocking stGltutes that forbid their citizens from
complying with certain U.S. discovery requests.
See William S. Dodge,
Extraterritorinlify
Unilaferlllism, 39

nnd

Conj7.icts-oj-Lmus

Tlzenry:

An

Argument

for

fudicinl

HARV. INT'L LJ. 101, 164 & n.357 (1998) ("The extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws hus led a number of other countries to enact
retaliatory legislation in the form of blocking and clawback statutes.").
1so There are inten.1ationa 1 sections to state regulatory authorities, but they
play no role in discipline. Their functions are limited to organizing research,
networking opportunities, and symposia on issues of international law and
practice. SRf\ CODEOP CONDUCT R 15 (2007).
J57 Cf Wilkins, supm note 9, at SJ0-11 (noting that, since enlorcen'lent officials
invariab1y exercise a certain amount of discretionary authority over the content of
professional norms when they apply ethical rules in particular cases, "conferring
enforcement authority is tantamount to empowering a particular set of actors to
place their own interpretation on these m11biguous professional norms'').
151< Sec supra Sectiun 2.3.4.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21
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interna tional

and

fore ign

law

have

been

1 085
distorted

w hen

interpreted by national courts . l 59
An equ ally i mportant, and ultimately related, i s sue is that any
adj u d icatory tribunal mt1 s t ha ve the ability t o sanc tion and control
the behavior of attorneys appearing before them.

The abil ity to

apply rules i mplies the ability to develop and refine their content.
Interna tional tribu nals and their rules of conduct cannot, as one
comm.enta tor

has

su ggested, be held " ca p tive to o u t-of-state
discipl inary author1ties . " t 60 T he I CTY, which is the international
tribunal that has most directly engaged issues of ethical conduct
and regulation, has an establ ished record of assessing allege d

misconduct by attorneys and issuing sanctions for contempt of
court .

Some tribu nals seem reticent to e xercise any discipl inary

role, while o ther tribunals, p articularly international arbitration
tribunals, seem to doubt their own power to do so (or face legal
impediments

to doing so) .

The power to resolve i m portant

international and transnational legal issues must be understood as
being

accompanied

by

a

and
1
attorneys who p articipate in those proceedings . 1 6

5.
Many

of the worl d's

power

to

control

regu la te

the

CONCLUSION
most urgent

issues

of transnational

regulation are increasingly being funneled into international and
transnational a djudications.
managed by

a dv ocates

These a dj u dications are brought and

w hose

ties

and

commitments

to

p articular l e ga l system are often p artial and tangentia l .

any
The

response to resulting a mbiguities about what e thical rules apply to
their conduct has primarily been a reliance on choice-of-law rules

159
See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Applicntion of
International Law: A n A n a lysis of A ttitudes of National Courts, 4 EuR. J. INT' L L. 1 59,

1 6 0-75 (1 993 ) (discussing reasons that prompt most national courts to approach
international norms apprehensively and limit their application within national
legal systems).
160 Daly, supra note 2, at 778. Daly refers to domestic U.S. courts being held
captive to the regulatory authorities of a different state, but the problem she
identifies is equally applicable in the international context.
161 This power may not be as acceptable in some other systems that do not
give judicial officers a role in domestic contexts. For example, in France,
professional regulations are enforced locally by the conseil de l 'o rdre, which is the
only organ that has the power to sanction members for violations of rules of
conduct. See CHRJSTJNA DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTP.il 1 20
(2 d ed. 1 996 ) (" [The COI/Seil] has disciplinary powers and can sanction professional
faults or infringements of rules of conduct." ) .
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pnrticular national

ethical rules.

emerging realization, however, of t h e

inadequacy
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There is nn
of national

ethical ru Jes, which were designed to apply to dmnestic practices
i n domestic procedural contexts, i n regulating global advoc<Ky.
l\lloreover, regulatory a u thorities are l i m i ted i n t h e i r ability to
apply foreign ethical rules or effectively evaluate conduct before
foreign tribunals through conventional rnodes of regulation.
The curn3nl ,·crsion of Rule 8.5 was a n important mechanism

for bringing these issues to light.
Now, however, additional
systernatic a n a ly sis is needed to provide more n1eaningfu 1 rules.

Those rules musl be i m p lemented not in isolation, b u t through
developed international networks and perhaps even eventua1lv an
international regula tory body.
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